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The Rising Tide of Reverse Flow: Would a Legislative 
Breakwater Violate U.S. Treaty Commitments? 
"Reverse flow" -the investment by foreign corporations1 in the 
American economy-has taken the United States by surprise. Just 
a few years ago, although U.S.-based firms were rapidly acquiring or 
establishing subsidiaries abroad, the extent of foreign investment in 
1. Investment in the American economy by foreign individuals, while it does exist. 
is normally not aimed at gaining control of an American corporation. 
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this country was quite small.Ji However, foreign companies are in-
creasingly buying control of U.S. companies.3 The alarm that this 
change has generated is indicated by the extensive publicity given 
to the battle of the management of Texasgulf, Inc., against a tender 
offer by Canada Development Corporation.4 
As a result of the recent decline of the U.S. dollar on world money 
markets and depressed prices on U.S. stock exchanges, many Amer-
ican stocks have become available at bargain prices. 0 At the same time, 
some nations have built up large dollar surpluses, which can be best 
reduced by purchases in the U.S.6 Also, the U.S. economy attracts 
investment because of the relative political stability of the country 
and the existence of a large consumer market for technically ad-
vanced, high-profit-margin consumer items.7 Many foreign firms feel 
2. See Table 1 infra. 
3. For a list of recent foreign acquisitions of moderate-to-large U.S. companies, such 
as Gimbel Brothers, Inc. (195 million dollar tender offer for 100 per cent of the out-
standing shares) and Ronson Corp. (18,7 million dollar tender offer for 52 per cent 
of the outstanding shares), see On the Prowl: Europeans, Japanese Find the Time is 
Ripe to Acquire U.S. Firms, Wall St. J., June 22, 1973, at 1, col 6 (midwest ed.), The 
article implies that this new phenomenon of foreign takeovers was unexpected, For addi-
tional statistics and examples of takeovers, see Detroit Free Press, Feb. 4, 1974, at 6-B, 
cols. 1-3. See also The Foreign Challenge, BUSINESS IN BRIEF, Dec. 1973 (unpaged publica-
tion of the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.). 
4. In a month-long court battle, officials of Texasgulf, Inc., attempted to 
block a tender offer by the Canada Development Corporation (CDC) for ten million 
shares or about 35 per cent of Texasgulf's outstanding shares. The Texasgulf manage-
ment not only advised stockholders not to buy, but also sought an injunction against 
the tender offer. See Lipton, Book Review, 72 MICH. L. REv. 358, 361 n.19 (1973) •• The 
federal district court granted a temporary restraining order but later denied a per-
manent injunction. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP, 
1J 94,160 (S.D. Tex. 1973). 
After the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals dissolved the temporary restraining order, 
CDC began to acquire the more than eight million shares that had been tendered, Wall 
St. J., Oct. 12, 1973, at 13, col, 2 (midwest ed.), See generally Cooney & Metz, The 
Canadian Caper-Texasgulf, id., Aug. 30, 1973, at 8, col, 3, The article notes that this 
suit "unofficially accused" the Canadian government of attempting to expropriate 
American interests in Canada because CDC is partially owned by the Canadian govern-
ment and Texasgulf's major mines are located in Canada. See generally Financial Post 
(Toronto), Sept. 15, 1973, at 13, col. I; id., Sept. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 7; id., Sept. 22, 1973, 
at 6, col. 3. 
Not all foreign tender offCIS have generated such conflict. For example, the Wall 
Street Journal, Sept. 21, 1973, at 30, col. 1 (midwest ed.), reported that a tender offer 
by Thyssen-Bornemisza Group N.V., a Netherlands-based concern, for 26 to 32 per cent 
of the shares of Indian Head, Inc., a U.S. corporation, was approved by the Indian 
Head chairman and president, who welcomed the opportunity to work with the like-
minded foreign management. 
5. Hein, Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: The Non-American 
Challenge, WoRLDBUSINESS P.ERSPECI'IVES No. 16, Aug. 1973 (unpaged publication of the 
Conference Board). 
6. Id • 
. 7. See id. The foreign investor who is interested in capital appreciation, but who 
also desires investment flexibility, will also be attracted to the U.S. securities markets 
because of their depth, i.e., their ability to supply or absorb substantial quantities of 
various securities without wild fluctuations in price. Depth is mainly dependent on 
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that manufacturing in the U.S. will reduce their costs (not an un-
reasonable expectation now that the cost of labor in the U.S. is no 
longer so much higher than it is elsewhere) and increase their U.S. 
sales.8 Some are also eager to get a foothold irl the U.S. in order to 
safeguard their position in U.S. markets, which they feel may be 
threatened by a growth in U.S. protectionism.9 
One very harsh proposal, generated by the alarm that reverse 
flow has created among some groups, has already been put before 
the House of Representatives.10 On June 25, 1973, Representatives 
John H. Dent and Joseph M. Gaydos introduced H.R. 8951 "[t]o 
amend the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to restrict persons. who 
are not citizens of the United States from acquiring . . . more than 
5 per centum of the voting securities of any issuer whose securities 
are registered under such Act .... "11 The purpose of the bill is to 
prevent "direct investment,"12 the gaining of control of U.S. corpo-
rations by foreigners,18 rather than to discourage the influx of foreign 
funds into the U.S. through passive or "portfolio" investment.14 
market size. Cohen, Toward an International Securities Market, 5 LAw 8e PouCY IN 
INTL. Bus. 357, 387-88 (1973), 
8. Hein, supra note 5. 
9. BUSINESS IN BRIEF, supra note 3. 
IO. Other Congressmen who are concerned about foreign takeovers J:,.ave not yet 
introduced any legislative proposals. For example, Senator Lloyd Bentson of Texas 
is interested in devising legislation that would restrict acquisition of U.S. companies 
by foreign governments and their agencies. Letter from Sen. Bentson to Michigan Law 
Review, Nov. 27, 1973. Representative John Moss of California has also expressed his 
concern over the possibility of takeovers of U.S. defense contractors. Wall St. J., Sept. 7, 
1973, at I, col. 5 (midwest ed.). 
Many U.S. officials are not so leery of foreign investment. The Department of 
Commerce and several states, e.g., Illinois, Michigan, and New York, actively solicit 
foreign investment. See Hein, supra note 5. See also Wall St. J., June 22, 1973, at I, col. 
6 (midwest ed.). 
11. Preamble to H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). The bill was reintroduced in 
the same form, but with 12 additional sponsors, on November 6, 1973, as H.R. 11265, 
93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973). · 
12. "Direct investment" is defined as ownership of equity in a foreign firm accom-
panied by a managerial control over the producing assets. G. Dufay 8e R. Naumann-
Etienne, International Business and the Multinational Corporation: Definitions, 
Concepts, Dimensions 42 (undated) [draft of unpublished manuscript on file with the 
Michigan Law Review], Direct investment primarily involves investment by companies 
of one nation in the economy of another in the form of wholly or partially owned 
subsidiaries. 
13, See H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1973); H.R. 11265, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 
§ 2 (1973). 
14. "Portfolio investment" is passive in that the inyestor does not seek managerial 
control of the company. G. Dufay &: R. Naumann-Etienne, supra note 12, at 39-40. 
Foreign investment can take many other forms, e.g., licenses, management contracts, 
land purchases, and even advertising expenditures for the sale of goods in a foreign 
country or the extension of credit upon their sale. Some of these forms could give the 
foreign investor some degree of control over a domestic company. However, direct 
investment is the most common form of foreign investment where control is sought. Id. 
at 42. 
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However, the bill would ·also limit each foreign investor to the 
ownership of thirty-five per cent of the nonvoting securities of any 
U.S. company.15 
Up to the present the United States has imposed few restrictions 
on foreign direct investment.16 It has never enacted any limitations 
as sweeping as those proposed by the Dent-Gaydos bill. This Note 
will briefly discuss the need for such restrictions and then examine 
the extent to which a reversal in policy is permitted by existing U.S. 
treaty obligations. 
The case for restrictions on direct investment rests primarily on 
the undesirable sociopolitical consequences that may arise from 
foreign control of U.S. companies.17 When a foreign company estab-
lishes or acquires a subsidiary in the United States, the power to 
make decisions that directly affect both U.S. employees and means 
of production located in U.S. communities is vested in a decision-
making body outside of U.S. society and independent of it in several 
important respects. The heacJ.quarters of the foreign investor and, 
typically, most of its assets are physically outside U.S. boundaries; 
the management and owners of the foreign investor have no ties of 
citizenship that may influence them to put U.S. interests first; and 
the foreign company may have profitable operations, in its home 
country and elsewhere, that make it less dependent on the success 
of its U.S. subsidiary and more likely to take a global outlook in its 
decision-making process.18 
It has been contended that the independence of the foreign inves-
tor could seriously damage the nation's economy or even endanger 
its defense efforts. Great concern has been expressed over a possible 
danger to U.S. labor in that the foreign investor may be more likely 
to liquidate a U.S. subsidiary without concern for the jobs of U.S. 
employees. For example, in introducing his bill in the House, 
Representative Gaydos said: 
15. H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973); H.R. 11265, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 
(1973). 
16. For e.'\:isting restrictions, see text accompanying notes 182-87 infra. 
17. There is not much scholarly writing on this subject as it relates to the U.S. 
However, more attention has been given to it by other nations that earlier felt the 
consequences of foreign-especially U.S.-control of their industry. For an introduction, 
see C. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 389-407 (4th ed. 1968). For a French 
view, see P. JASINSKI, REGIME JURIDIQUE DE LA LIBRE CIRCULATION DES CAPITAUX 16-21 
(1967). For an influential popular work, see J. SERVAN-SCHREIBER, THE AMERICAN 
CHALLENGE (R. Steel trans. 1968) (original title: LE DEFI AMERICAIN). 
18. For example, one theory of direct investment is the "gambling theory," according 
to which a firm undertakes to pyramid a small investment overseas into a large one 
by reinvesting 50 per cent of overseas earnings each year. C. KINDLEBERGER, supra note 
17, at 390. An investor with this attitude will view itself as having relatively little to 
lose if its investment goes bad. Since the firm will have other sources of profits, it will 
be under no pressure to make the overseas subsidiary successful, and bankruptcy might 
well be a common result. · 
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And, what guarantee do the few Americans working for a foreign 
employer have that their boss would not pack up and go home after 
trampling the competition. Or, if economic conditions are such that 
it would be cheaper for him to make his product back home do you 
think he would hesitate a minute? Do you think he would have the 
slightest concern as to what ·wi.11 happen to his employees and their 
families?19 
In addition, U.S. creditors would be endangered if the foreign inves-
tor were to let its subsidiary go bankrupt and refuse to satisfy its 
excess debt.20 Other groups that stand to suffer from the foreign 
investor's takeover include minority shareholders, who may suffer 
at the hands of any foreign majority but are especially vulnerable 
where the foreign investor is a government entity (which may put 
national interests before those of corporate profitability);21 suppliers 
of goods and services, which may suffer from the foreigner's policy 
of buying from its own nation;22 and the local community, whose 
charitable and civic organizations may not receive the support from 
the company after acquisition that they did when it was owned by 
local residents. 
The extension of foreign control into the U.S. economy may also 
produce clashes when the foreign investor's policies, or those of its 
nation of incorporation, conflict with U.S. goals. A U.S. President 
may be unable to persuade the foreign :illanagement of U.S. indus-
19. 119 CONG. REc. H6891 (daily ed. July 30, 1973) (remarks by Rep. Gaydos). The 
same response to adverse economic conditions could, of course, be made by a domestically 
owned company. One might argue that the foreign investor is more prone to miscal-
culate the profitability of a U.S. investment because it will be dealing with a foreign 
economic system and a foreign culture. However, large foreign investments are probably 
most likely to be made by large and sophisticated multinational companies, which 
have the money and resources to study proposed expansion plans carefully. Moreover, 
in many situations the unsuccessful foreign investor will be able to sell an unwanted 
subsidiary, so that an investment mistake will not necessarily mean loss of jobs for the 
U.S. employees. 
20. The realism of these fears is attested to by U.S. companies' actions abroad. For 
instance, when Jos. Schlitz Brewing Company's Belgian acquisition failed, Schlitz let 
its subsidiary, whose plant had been built by three Belgian brewers with Belgian 
government aid, file for bankruptcy and did not itself satisfy the excess debt. The 
resultant loss to creditors and the loss of jobs to workers in the depressed and mining 
region of Ghlin caused some embarrassment, not only to Schlitz, but also to the .U.S. 
government. See Schlitz Goes Flat in Europe Again, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 26, 1970, at 23-24. 
21. This was alleged to have been the case in the CDC takeover of Texasgulf. See 
note 4 supra. Texasgulf claimed that the U.S. minority shareholders might suffer because 
CDC would not be exclusively interested in maximizing profits and dividends. This 
fear was founded on the fact that CDC is a corporation created by the Canadian 
government for the purpose of encouraging the creation of strong Canadian-owned 
enterprises within the Canadian economy. Thus, in a case of conflict between goals that 
would advance Canadian interests and the goal of profit maximization, it was feared 
that CDC would be obligated under Canadian law to opt for the former. 
22. For example, General Motors in Australia followed the practice of purchasing 
in the U.S. unless the Australian producer offered at least a 10 per cent saving. C. 
KINDLEBERGER, supra note 17, at 401. See also P. JASINSKI, supra note 17, at 19. 
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tries to accept voluntary restraints on price increases, while domesti• 
cally owned industries have on occasion agreed to such suggestions.23 
In addition, products of U.S. subsidiaries could be sold through the 
foreign parent in derogation of a U.S. embargo.24 This conflict would 
be especially likely to occur where the foreign investor is owned or 
directly controlled by a foreign government.21i 
Finally, the absence of restrictions raises the possibility that 
control of U.S. means of production might be sought for purposes 
inimical to U.S. security. A foreign investor-again, especially one 
owned or controlled by a foreign government-might want to con-
trol a large company in order to be able to disrupt the U.S. economy 
or to use the threat of disruptions to gain political leverage. Foreign 
control of a vital defense supplier might even compromise national 
defense.26 
However, most foreign direct investors enter the U.S. market for 
business reasons. The decision-making processes of these investors, 
who are primarily interested in profit, will not be markedly different 
from those of U.S. investors. Because the foreign investor wants to 
preserve and multiply its investment in the United States, it is 
not independent, for the fate of its subsidiary is bound up with that 
of the U.S. economy as a whole. Moreover, to the extent that its 
interest in profit leads to a lack of responsiveness to the concerns 
of local communities and citizens and the possibility of conflict with 
national policies, the foreign-held corporation is no different from 
U.S. conglomerates and multinationals. 
Through its investment activities in the United States the foreign 
investor is brought at least partially under the dominion of U.S. 
23: For example, President Kennedy was able to get the major steel producers to 
agree voluntarily to rescind price increases in 1962. See N.Y. Times, April 14, 1962, at 1, 
col 8 (late city ed.). 
24. The U.S. has experienced this problem in reverse. In December 1964, Fruehauf• 
France, a French company in which the American company, Fruehauf Corporation, 
owned a two-thirds stock interest, contracted with another French company to deliver 
60 Fruehauf vans for eventual delivery to the People's Republic of China. Pursuant to 
the Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-44 (1970), the U.S. Treasury 
Department ordered that the contract not be executed, but when the other French 
company refused to rescind the contract, the French minority directors of Fruehauf-
France brought suit in a French court to enforce the contract The Court of Appeals 
of P;iris affirmed a decision for the French plaintiffs, and the United States Treasury 
Department decided not to press its order. Fruehauf Corp. v. S.A. des Automobiles 
Berliet, 5 INTL. LEGAL MATERIALS 476 (1966). 
25. See note 21 supra. 
26. 119 CoNG. R.Ec. H6891 (daily ed. July 30, 1973) (remarks by Rep. Gaydos): 
, There is another facet that concerns me. It is the possibility that a struggle 
for market domination might occur in an industry that is vital to our national 
defense. Suppose it were the specialty steel industry at stake, and the American 
manufacturer was forced out of business. Could anyone here sleep easy, knowing 
his country's ability to defend itself rested in the hands of a manufacturer who 
has pledged allegiance to another flag? 
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law. Such regulatory ~nactments as the National Labor Relations 
Act, 27 the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 28 and the Internal Revenue 
Code, as well as the common law of contracts, torts, and corpora-
tions, require U.S. citizens to adhere to certain national policies and 
refrain from misbehavior. They have the same effect on foreign 
investors to the extent that the laws encompass the investor and its 
U.S. company.29 Although jurisdiction over and service of process 
upon a foreign-held U.S. subsidiary or a foreign investor that resides 
in the U.S. can usually be easily obtained,30 difficulties may arise 
when a plaintiff seeks to bring a nonresident foreign investor before 
a U.S. court. Even if some form of overseas service of process is avail-
able,31 the U.S. court may lack personal and subject matter juris-
27. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-68 (1970). 
28. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1-7, 12-27, 44 (1970). 
29. Under international law there is no objection to the application of U.S. law to 
the acts of foreign persons or corporations in U.S. territory. "Generally speaking, a 
state has jurisdiction over all persons and property within its territory." W. BISHOP, 
INTERNATIONAL I.Aw, CAsEs AND MATERIALS 535 (3d ed. 1971). "The jurisdiction of the 
nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and absolute, It is susceptible 
of no limitation not imposed by itself." Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch) 116, 136 (1812) (Marshall, C.J.). 
For general works written to introduce the foreign investor to the United States 
legal system, see R. ROSENDAHL, H. HOWARD, C. RATHKOPF, JR., D. WALLACE, JR., & 
H. K.RONSTEIN, LEGAL ENVIRONMENT FOR FOREIGN Dnmcr !NvE.sTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
(Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown University, undated) 
and PROCEEDINGS OF THE CoNFERENCE ON FOREIGN DIREcr INVESI'MENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
(Institute for International and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown University, 1970). For 
more specialized treatment of one area, see Zeitlin & Rosso, United States Taxation of 
Foreign Enterprises-Structures for Doing Business in the United States and the Western 
Hemisphere, 23 BULL. INTL. FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 555 (1969). 
30. A person or company can be sued in the courts of a state if it is "found" in that 
state. The test for its presence is the existence of certain minimal contacts that make 
its subjection to the power of the court consonant with due process. See International 
Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). A U.S. subsidiary will be found in its 
state of incorporation, where it will probably be required to maintain an office or agent, 
see, e.g., MicH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. § 450.1241 (1973), and in those states in which it does 
business. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972). 
The problems of finding an officer or agent of the subsidiary for purposes of service 
of process will be no worse than in the case of U.S.-owned companies. Typically, in the 
case of a suit brought in the state of incorporation, a state statute may authorize 
service by mail if no officer or member can be found. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LA.ws ANN. 
ch. 223, § 37 (Supp. 1972), 
If the corporation does maintain business activity within U.S. territory, it will 
probably have within the U.S. significant amounts of assets, which can be used to satisfy 
money judgments. A creditor faces the same risk of dealing with an asset-poor ·corpora-
tion when the owners are U.S. citizens, and in both cases he can take precautions by 
extending less credit, taking security interests, or requiring personal guarantees. The 
liquidation and subsequent disappearance of a corporation owned by nonresident 
foreigners may present a problem, however, when a remedy other than money damages 
is sought. In practice, these problems are diminished where the corporation has sub-
stantial tangible assets at the time of liquidation and by the availability of procedures 
for attachment, garnishment, and temporary restraining orders. 
81. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize service on a party in a foreign 
country by mail with return receipt or through the use of letters rogatory. FED. R. Civ. 
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diction if the allegedly ·wrongful act takes place outside the United 
States. The minimum contacts with the forum that are required for 
personal jurisdiction may be lacking where the investor never enters 
the United States.82 However, jurisdiction over the nonresident 
defendant may be obtained even in that case if there is an applicable 
state long-arm statute or a specialized federal statute.88 Subject 
matter jurisdiction over an extraterritorial act by a nonresident 
alien may be sustained on the theory that the alleged wrongdoing 
had an "effect" within the United States.84 Although U.S. courts 
have accepted this doctrine,85 it has been much criticized.36 There-
fore, the extension of U.S. jurisdiction over nonresidents who have 
never entered the United States is a potential source of friction be-
P. 4(i). The U.S. is also a party to the multilateral Convention on the Service Abroad 
of Judicial and Extra judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov, 15, 1965, 
[1969] I U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S, No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163, to which most of our major 
trading partners also belong. 
32. See note 30 supra. 
33. See note 30 supra. Section 5 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1970), allows a 
court administering the Act to call before it such parties as "the ends of justice require." 
See also 35 U.S.C. § 293 (1970) (jurisdiction over foreign patentees). 
34. The "effects" theory is easy to understand in the context of the crime of murder: 
If X standing in Canada shoots Y standing in Minnesota, the effects doctrine would 
support U.S. jurisdiction. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9, which 
involved a prosecution for manslaughter, is commonly cited in support of the doctrine, 
although in reality the 12-judge court was evenly split on the issue and only the 
President's casting vote decided the case. There is little other international precedent 
for the doctrine. Dickenson, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 A.llr. J. INTL. L. 435 
(Supp. 1935). 
35. In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir,), modified, 405 F,2d 215 
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969), the court held that "the district court 
has subject matter jurisdiction over violations of the Securities Exchange Act although 
the transactions which are alleged to violate the Act take place outside the United 
States, at least when the transactions involve stock registered and listed on a national 
securities exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American investors," 405 
F.2d at 208. The Schoenbaum holding was subsequently expanded in Leasco Data Proc• 
essing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), where Friendly, J., 
upheld jurisdiction over a foreign company whose stock was not traded on a U.S. market 
but where the impact of defendants' alleged misconduct affected U.S. shareholders and 
where there was sufficient evidence of "substantial misrepresentations" made in the 
. United States. 468 F.2d at 1337. Leasco's very liberal standards for extra territorial juris, 
diction have been followed in Travis v, Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir. 
1973); SEC v. United Financial Group, Inc., 474 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1973); and United 
States v. Clark, 359 F. Supp. 131 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also United States v. Aluminum Co. 
of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (Sherman Act held to prohibit agreements 
made in Canada between a Canadian subsidiary of a U.S. corporation and otl1er non• 
national companies that restricted the supply of aluminum to the United States). 
36. See K. BREWSTER, AN1TrRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 65-75 (1958); 
Raymond, A New Look at the Jurisdiction in Alcoa, 61 AM, J. INTL. L. 558 (1967); 
Metzger, The "Effects" Doctrine of Jurisdiction, 61 AM, J. INTL, L. 1015 (1967), The 
espousal of the "effects" doctrine in Alcoa may be somewhat undercut by the fact that 
the Canadian subsidiary of Alcoa had its "effective business headquarters" in New York, 
K. BREWSTER, supra, at 73. 
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tween the United States and other countries, who may take it as an 
affront to their sovereignty.37 
The substantive scope of U.S. law does not respond directly to 
some of the chief fears raised by foreign investment. For instance, 
no law requires an investor to maintain his investment. The possi-
bility that the foreigner is more likely to ignore the disruptive effects 
is-not addressed by any present law. The foreign investor is as free as 
the citizen to withdraw' or abandon his investment, even. if this 
causes economic and social disruption.38 But generally applicable 
legal obligations raise the price of liquidation and, along with the 
profi~ motive, induce the investor to continue his investment. For 
example, if the foreign-owned company breaches a contract in the 
course of liquidation, the other party to the contract has a cause of 
action for damages. In addition, U.S. minority shareholders may 
police irresponsible liquidation and fraudulent management through 
derivative suits.39 No laws at present specifically limit the siz~ 
of foreign acquisitions or the growth of foreign-held companies. The 
antitrust laws, which reach U.S.-held as well as foreign-owned com-
panies, may prohibit certain acquisitions40 and impose some limits 
37. The real problem in applyi_ng the doctrine to economic activity lies in the fact 
that economic effects of a particular act may reach quite unanticipated areas of the 
world. This problem becomes more acute as the world's economies become more in-
terrelated. Thus, it is very difficult to distinguish between extraterritorial conduct, that 
has a sufficient territorial effect to justify a jurisdictional claim and extraterritorial 
conduct that does not, since all extraterritorial economic behavior has some such effect. 
See generally Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, I I.Aw & POLICY IN INTI.. Bus. 168 (1969) (approving Schoenbaum, supra note 35, 
but warning against the sweeping terms of its holding); Bator, Extraterritorial Applica-
tion of Law: United States Securities Laws, in Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law, 64 AM. J. INTI.. L., Sept. 1970, at 141 (criticizing breadth of Schoen-
baum holding); Stokes, Limits Imposed by International Law on Regulation of Ex-
traterritorial Commercial Activity, in Proceedings of the American Society of Inter-
national Law, 64 AM. J. !NTL. L., Sept. 1970, at 135. 
38. One limitation on disposal of any stockholding is section 9(a)(2) of t}ie Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2) (1970), which makes it unlawful to manipulate 
stock prices. See generally 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1549-60 (2d ed. 1961). 
39. A shareholder's derivative suit was suggested by the court in Texasgulf, Inc. v. 
Canada Development Corp., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ,I 94,160 (S.D. Te.x. 1973), discussed 
in note 4 supra, as a way of "protecting the interests of minority shareholders." 
,i 94,160 at 94,695. Moreover, courts will prevent corporate dissolutions that are 
unduly oppressive of minority shareholders, especially where the dissolution is effected 
to "squeeze out" the minority. See H. HENN, CORPORATIONS 720, 723 (2d ed. 1970), and 
the cases cited in id. at 723 n.2ll. See also Sprecher, The Right of Minority Stockholders 
to Prevent the Dissolution of a Profitable Enterprise, 33 KY. L.J. 150 (1945). In general, 
majority shareholders are held to have a fiduciary duty towards the minority. See Pepper 
v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919). 
All of these remedies may be ineffective if the foreign shareholder is able to flee 
U.S. jurisdiction with its ill-gotten gains. This problem, however, is one that might also 
arise in dealing with a U.S. shareholder. 
40. Charges of violations of antitrust laws have been used by U.S. managements 
opposing foreign tender offers. See, e.g., Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., CCH 
FED. SEc. L. REP. ,I 94,160 (S.D. Tex. 1973), discussed in note 4 supra. 
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on growth.41 However, they do not ensure that foreign investors will 
never gain a commanding share of a U.S. industry, because they 
neither prevent the growth of economic power through excellence42 
nor necessarily prohibit foreign acquisition of large U.S. com-
panies.48 
In summary, the web of private remedies and penal sanctions 
available under U.S. laws of general application force upon the 
foreign investor a degree of involvement· in American society that 
does much to make it as accountable as a comparable domestic inves• 
tor. Nevertheless, the possibility does remain that a foreign investor, 
particularly one that mvns a large share of U.S. industry, could be 
a disruptive force. 
More0ver, the foreign investor who hopes to sabotage U.S. 
defense efforts will be only slightly hindered by economic and legal 
restraints, especially if it is a foreign government investor with large 
amounts of money to pour into its investment. This type of investor, 
not motivated by a desire for profit, will care little about economic 
losses or general legal sanctions, except where they might hinder 
the scheme of sabotage. Only a few statutes are specifically designed 
to protect the U.S. from the dangers of foreign mvnership of defense 
contractors. The release of classified information to defense contrac• 
tors44 and to contractors with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency45 is regulated, and alien mvnership or control of atomic 
41. Section '1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970), forbids mergers and acquisi-
tions that substantially lessen competition in any line of commerce or area of the 
United States. This statute was applied to prevent the merger of Schlitz, a leading 
American beer company, with John Labatt, Ltd., a leading Canadian beer company, 
believed to be a potential competitor for Schlitz in the U.S. United States v. Jos. Schlitz 
Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), afjd. per curiam, 385 U.S. 37 (1966). This 
provision could also be used to prevent foreign companies from buying out their U.S. 
competitors for U.S. markets. . 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970), prohibits monopolization. While 
there is some dispute over the scope of section 2, it has long been held to prohibit 
acquisition of a monopoly by restraints on trade, e.g., coercing the customers and sup-
pliers of competitors. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), It 
has also been applied in situations where the alleged monopolist has not engaged in any 
restraints on trade, but has simply expanded to meet market demand and thereby 
exclude competitors, United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (Alcoa), 148 F,2d 416 
(2d Cir. 1945), or has engaged in legitimate and common business practices that have 
excluded competitors. United States v, United Shoe Machinery Corp,, 110 F. Supp, 295 
(D. Mass. 1953), afjd. per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954), 
Between them, the Clayton and Sherman Acts may make it difficult for a large 
foreign company to (1) acquire a large U.S. company in its line of business, (2) capture 
a large U.S. market share in a line of business by expanding a small U.S. company, or 
(3) maintain a large market share over a period of time, 
42. See United States v. Aluminum Co, of America (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 429-80 
(2d Cir. 1945). 
43. The Clayton Act will probably only apply if the acquiring foreign investor is 
a competitor or potential competitor of the U.S. target company. See note 41 supra. 
44. Exec. Order No. 10,865, 3 C.F.R. § 82 (1978), 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). 
45. 22 u.s.c. § 2585 (1970). 
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energy production or utilization facilities is prohibited.46 Also, the 
Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness is authorized to 
develop programs to ensure the physical security of public and 
private facilities important to defense efforts.47 Although the amount 
of money needed to buy contrQI of many defense contractors may 
make the likelihood that an unfriendly power would adopt such a 
scheme of sabotage seem remote, it is a possibility,48 and present U.S. 
law does little to forestall it. Thus, the fears of adverse sociopolitical 
consequences have their greatest validity with respect to foreign take-
overs of defense suppliers. 
Even if the laws as they presently exist are not considered suffi-
cient, before enacting specific restrictive legislation, Congress should 
consider the extent of the problem and the adverse consequences 
that may arise from the restrictions themselves. That the potential 
danger from foreign investment is less serious than might appear at 
first glance is demonstrated by the diversity and relatively small 
extent of present investment. Although the available data provides 
only a very rough approximation,49 they do help to put the debate 
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d), 2134(d) (1970). 
47. Exec. Order No. 10,421, 50 U.S.C. § 404 (1970). Although section l(b) of the order 
defines "physical security" in a broad way that could include protection against foreign 
takeovers ("security against sabotage, espionage, and other hostile activity and destruc-
tive acts and omissions"), the order seems to have been primarily intended to deal with 
sabotage by physical destruction of property. 
48. Foreign investors have shown that they have the financial power to purchase 
controlling interests in defense contractors. During the summer of 1973, for example, 
Cemp Investments, Ltd., of Canada made a 44.5 million dollar tender offer for roughly 
IO per cent of the outstanding shares of Signal Cos., whose subsidiary, Garrett Corp., 
has important, highly sensitive defense contracts. Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1973, at 29, col. 5 
(midwest ed.); id., Sept. 7, 1973, at 1, col. 5. 
49. The statistics cited in this Note come primarily from U.S. Department of Com-
merce publications. The figures may be distorted by approximations arising on several 
different levels. In the first place, the data on foreign direct investment is based on a 
sample of a large number of firms and does not represent all direct investment. In the 
case of foreign direct investment in the U.S., 400 /of the larger foreign-owned firms are 
surveyed. Leftwich, Foreign Direct Investments in the United States, 1962-71, 53 SURVEY 
OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Feb. 1973, at 29. The figures are then extrapolated to estimate all 
direct investment of the kind being measured by reference to benchmark figures from 
an earlier year, which may now be out of date. 
In the second place, purchases for direct investment are distinguished from purchases 
for portfolio investment by reference to an arbitrarily chosen percentage of foreign own-
ership. In the case of foreign investment in the U.S., the U.S. Department of Commerce 
uses 25 per cent foreign ownership of the voting stock as the cut-off line between direct 
and portfolio investment. Leftwich, supra, at 29 n.2. In the case of U.S. direct invest-
ment abroad, 10 per cent is the cut-off. Lupo, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1972, 
53 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Sept. 1973, at 20, 33. But the conceptual distinction 
between direct and portfolio investment is based on control, and the amount of stock 
ownership necessary for control varies from corporation to corporation. Consequently, 
the mechanical distinction based on a specific percentage produces, at best, a rough 
correspondence between the conceptual models and the transactions actually measured. 
Nevertheless, as long as foreign direct investors tend to have high levels of ownership 
of their U.S. subsidiaries, as is now the case, Leftwich, supra, at 32, this aspect of ap-
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TABLE 1 
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ExmNT OF DIRECT INVESTMENT AND RATES OF GROWTH 
(a) Foreign Direct 
Investment in U.S. 
· (b) U.S. Direct 
Investment Abroad 
(c) Foreign Direct 
Investment as 
Percentage of U.S. 
Direct Investment 
,(d) Growth of 
Foreign Direct 
Investment 
(e) Growth of 
U.S. Direct 
Investment 
1960 
$ 6.9 
$31.9 
1970 
($billions) 
$13.3 
$78.2 
1971 
$13.7 
$86.2 
1972 
$94.0 
22% 17% 16% 15% 
1960-70 1970-71 1971-72 
145% 10% 
Sources: Lupo, U.S. Direct Investment Abroad in 1972, 53 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, 
Sept. 1973, at 20, 23, 24, tables 3 & 7. 
Leftwich & Boyke, Foreign Direct Investments in The United States in 1972, 
53 SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS, Aug. 1973, at 50, table I. 
over restrictions in its proper perspective. Table I shows the extent 
of both U.S. direct investment abroad and foreign investment in the 
U.S.50 In line (c) foreign direct investment is expressed as a percent-
proximation does not produce significant distortions. The Dent-Gaydos bill also adopts 
the method of distinguishing direct from portfolio investment through the use of an 
arbitrary percentage of ownership. The perceI}tage chosen for that bill (5 per cent) is 
much lower than that used by the economists. See H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, § 3 
(1973); H.R. 11265, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973). 
Finally, the figures for dollar values of assets held by foreign investors fail to mea-
sure accurately the value of assets controlled by foreign investors because they arc 
"book-value" figures only. Book-value figures, for example, of foreign direct investments 
in the United States are computed on the basis of (I) inflows on the foreign direct 
investment account in the balance of payments figures and (2) earnings of those invest-
ments retained in the country. The value of facilities financed with U.S. funds and 
changes in value due to appreciation will not be reflected in these figures. As a result, 
the use of book-value figures understates the e.xtent of foreign direct investment. See 
G. Dufay & R. Naumann-Etienne, supra note 12, at 48-52. 
50. The caveat about the degree of distortion, created by the way these measure-
ments are estimated, see note 49 supra, is especially important here. Whereas the "book 
values" for U.S. direct investment abroad generally correspond fairly well to the values 
of assets controlled because of the absence in many foreign countries of a well-developed 
credit market where the U.S. investor could finance his foreign subsidiary without mov• 
ing currency out of the U.S., the book values of foreign direct investment in the U.S. 
often understate considerably the value of assets controlled because of the many domes-
tic sources of finance that the foreign investor can utilize. G. Dufay & R. Naumann-
Etienne, supra note 12, at 63-64. This factor may explain why Japanese direct investment 
in the U.S. is reported as a negative value in Leftwich & Boyke, Foreign Direct Invest-
ments in the United States in 1972, 53 SURVEY OF CURRENT BusINESS, Aug, 1973, at 50, 
table I. Those authors offer as an additional explanation the fact that many Japanese-
owned companies had prepaid their imports from Japanese firms, Id, at 51, 
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age of direct investment abroad. The latter continues to dominate 
the former by a factor of five. In fact, in terms of value of assets, the 
economic significance of direct foreign investment in the U.S. is 
declining relative to that of U.S. direct investment abroad. 
An.other way of evaluating the extent of foreign direct invest-
ment is to compare it to the total assets of large U.S. corporations 
(Tables 2 and 3). In 1972, two U.S. corporations had assets exceeding 
TABLE 2 
SIZE OF U.S. COMPANIES 
Number of U.S. companies with assets over: 
$4.6 billion: 
$1.0 billion: 
Number of U.S. companies with stockholders' 
equity over: 
$4.6 billion: 
$1.0 billion: 
16 
119 
8 
46 
Source: The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial Corporations, FORTUNE, 
May 1973, at 222, 222-41. 
TABLE 3 
DISTRIBUTION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE U.S. BY SOURCE NATION 
(1972 figures) 
Number of Book Value Percentage 
Companies ($billions) of Total 
Country Investing Book Value 
Total $14.4 100% 
Great Britain 139 $ 4.6 32% 
Canada 105 $ 3.6 25% 
Netherlands 22 $ 2.3 16% 
Switzerland 33 $ 1.6 11% 
West Germany 96 $ 0.8 6% 
Total for these 395 $12.9 90% 
five countries 
Note: Japan, with 65 companies investing in the U.S., shows a balance for book value of 
-$0.l billion because of its companies' use of U.S. financing and because of 
prepayment of imports from Japanese parent firms. See note 50 supra. 
Sources: Leftwich&: Boyke, supra,Table 1, at 50, table 1. 
G. Dufay &: R. Naumann-Etienne, International Business and the Multina-
tional Corporation: Definitions, Concepts, Dimensions, at table 2.26 [draft of 
unpublished manuscript on file with the Michigan Law Review]. 
the total amount of foreign direct investment in the U.S.,51 and six-
teen had assets exceeding the total direct investment from Great 
Britain, the nation with the largest direct investment holdings in 
the U.S. One hundred and nineteen U.S. industrial corporations 
51. In 1972, Exxon reported total assets of 21.6 billion dollars, and General Motors 
had assets of 18.3 billion dollars. The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest Industrial 
Corporations, FORTUNE, May 1973, at 220, 222. 
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have assets comparable to the investments from ·each of the top five 
foreign investor nations. Even if the book value of foreign direct 
investment is compared to stockholders' equity in large U.S. indus-
trial corporations-perhaps a better indicator of the amount neces-
sary to buy control of these companies-the foreign-held subsidiaries 
are, if not small fish, at most large fish in a sea of U.S. whales.cm 
Foreign-held firms dominate no U.S. industry,63 and, in view of the 
sums that would be required to obtain dominance, extensive foreign 
takeovers of U.S. businesses seem unlikely.64 
Also, direct investment is not the major form of foreign invest-
ment in U.S. markets. Table 4 demonstrates that most foreign 
TABLE 4 
DIREcr INVESI'MENT COMPARED 'IO PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT FOR 1972 
U.S. Investment Abroad: 
Direct Investment 
Other (Mainly Portfolio 
Investment) 
Foreign Investment in the U.S.: 
Direct Investment 
Other (Mainly Portfolio 
Investment) 
Source: Lupo, supra Table I, at 23, table 3. 
Amount ($billions) 
$94.0 
$50.8 
$14.4 
$49.5 
% of Total 
Investment 
65% 
35% 
23% 
77% 
investment is in the form of portfolio investments and long-term 
bank loans. Thus, the bulk of foreign investors are presumably inter-
ested in dividends, interest, and capital gains-which can be obtained 
without control. 55 
52. See Table 2. Leftwich, supra note 49, at 32, also notes the generally small size of ~ 
foreign-owned U.S. subsidiaries. 
53. They do, however, hold a significant position in a few industries, e.g., pharma• 
ceuticals and nickel production. Id. at 32. 
54. See Balbach, Foreign Investment in the United States-A. Danger to Our Welfare 
and Sovereignty?, 55 FED. R.Es. BANK ST. Lours REv., Oct. 1973, at IO, for an argument 
that even continued U.S. dependence on oil from the Middle East would never give the 
oil-producing nations enough capital to buy control of our industry since the value of 
U.S. industry would rise more rapidly than those nations' accumulation of capital. The 
strength of the argument is weakened by several of the assumptions made by the author 
in constructing his theoretical model, most notably that the oil-producing countries 
would leave the price of oil fixed. They have not. See TIME, Jan. 7, 1974, at 36, 37. 
55. The caveat regarding the difficulty of foretelling the future from the entrails of 
the past bears emphasizing at this point. A great deal of the concern over foreign invest, 
ment in this country is generated, not by the present situation, but by fears about 
what might happen in the future. 
The present pattern of limited foreign direct investment yields no guarantee that 
it will not change tomorrow. A major fear is that the dollar or the stock market will 
decline further relative to other national currencies, producing bargain-basement prices 
on all U.S. industry. A renewed fall of the U.S. dollar would give the foreign investor 
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Moreover, the sources of foreign direct investment are very di-
verse (Table 3). No one nation accounts for the bulk of it,56 although 
ninety per cent comes from nations that have traditionally had 
close and amicable relations with the U.S. The total investment 
from each nation is in turn divided among many companies (Table 
3). Thus, no one interest lies behind any appreciable segment of 
investment. Because of their diversity of origin and their separate 
national interests, the likelihood that any significant group of for-
eign investors will act in concert is remote. On the contrary, the 
present investment structure indicates that each foreign company-
and each foreign country-has a relatively minor impact on the 
American economy. 
Since reverse flow poses a less serious threat than might at first 
appear, restrictive legislation may be unnecessary. In fact, the enact-
ment of restrictions may itself harm the U.S. economy. The magni-
tude of U.S. direct investment abroad and its rapid growth rate 
suggest that the United States economy could be seriously injured 
if other nations react to restrictive legislation with increased restric-
tions of their mvn. The extent of U.S. direct investment was in-
dicated above in Table 1. Table 5 shows the U.S. investor's share of 
foreign subsidiary earnings and the amounts actually received in 
interest, dividends, and branch earnings. Despite the small size of 
the earnings in comparispn with the U.S. gross na!ional product, 
some idea of the importance of U.S. direct investment can be gained 
by reference to the size of U.S. multinational companies (Table 4).57 
Unlike foreign investment in the United States, U.S. investment 
abroad is predominantly composed of direct investment (Table 3). 
Thus, the United States is particularly vulnerable to retaliation. 
Furthermore, as Tables 1 and 5 indicate, direct investment by 
U.S. corporations is growing rapidly. Since 1960 it has almost tripled_ 
in value. Although its growth rate slipped by one per cent in 1972 
(Table 1), it is still growing faster than foreign direct investment in 
the United States. Taking into account only the amounts actually 
an advantage over U.S. investors because the same risk would cost him less. To such 
"doomsday" argumentation, the best answer is to ask how likely such long-term declines 
in our economy are. As the dollar declines, U.S. products become more competitive 
internationally, and sales and revenues are increased. Moreover, the new technology; 
new products, and new management techniques that foreign investment introduces 
could play an important role in revitalizing U.S. industry. See Hein, supra note 5, 
56. In contrast, the U.S. is the principal foreign direct investor in many nations, e.g., 
West Germany (44 per cent), The Netherlands (45 per cent), and Belgium (56 per cent). 
G. Dufay & R. Naumann-Etienne, supra note 12, table 2.24 (based on 1968 data). 
57. The fact that only two of the one hundred nineteen U.S.-based multinational 
corporations with assets over 1 billion dollars had total assets reaching 18 billion dollars, 
see note 51 infra, indicates that the 94.0 billion dollars of direct investment is shared by 
many of our major companies. 
566 
On U.S. Direct Investment 
Abroad: 
Total Earnings 
Interest, Dividends 
& Branch Earnings 
after withholding 
taxes 
Michigan Law Review 
TABLE 5 
EARNINGS ON DIRECT INVESTMENT 
1971 
10,299 
7,295 
On Foreign Direct Investment 
in the U.S.: 
Total Earnings 
Interest, Dividends 
& Branch Earnings 
after withholding 
taxes 
U.S. Gross National 
Product 
Sources: Lupo, supra Table 1, at 24, table 7. 
621 
1,055,500 
Leftwich & Boyke, supra Table I, at 50, table I. 
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($ millions) 
1972 
12,386 
8,004 
1,233 
719 
1,155,200 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Current Business Statistics, 53 SURVEY OF CURRENT 
BuSINE.S.S, Aug. 1973, at 51. 
remitted, earnings grew by about ten per cent from 1971 to 1972 
(Table 5). 
While retaliation abroad for restrictive legislation in the U.S. 
could take the form of the expropriation of sizable U.S. holdings, 
such an extreme reaction is unlikely in those nations in which the 
U.S. has the largest investment stake. As Table 6 indicates, America's 
Country 
Total 
Canada 
Great Britain 
West Germany 
Australia 
France 
Total for these 
five countries 
Europe 
Japan 
TABLE 6 
DISTRIBUTION OF U.S. DIRECT !NVESTlllENT ABROAD 
Book Value 
($billions) 
$94.0 
$25.8 
$ 9.5 
$ 6.3 
$ 4.1 
$3.4 
$49.I 
$30.7 
$ 2.2 
Source: Lupo, supra Table I, at 26, table SA. 
Percentage 
of Total 
Book Value 
100% 
27% 
10% 
7% 
4% 
4% 
52% 
34% 
2% 
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most prominent investment partners include such traditional allies 
as Great Britain and Canada. Retaliation would more likely take the 
form of tighter restrictions on or of prohibitions against additional 
U.S. investment. Since those nations that receive the greatest share 
of U.S. investments are largely the same as those that invest most 
heavily in the U.S., such retaliation is not improbable. The expan-
sion of direct investment abroad could be severely reduced or elim-
inated entirely. 
Many countries already restrict foreign direct investment to 
some degree,58 and it may therefore seem that any further prohibi-
tions are unlikely. However, the existence of controls in France, 
Canada, and Japan has not prevented major amounts of U.S. invest-
ment from being introduced into those countries (Table 6). Existing 
restrictions could be made more severe. In most cases foreign invest-
ment is not prohibited altogether, but is subject to prior govern-
mental approval. It would be relatively easy to respond to U.S. 
restrictions by reducing the number of approvals. Moreover, some 
countries have no existing restrictions on foreign investment.59 If 
the United States joins the nations that impose restrictions, those that 
have not yet done so are likely to follow its lead. 
Even in the absence of retaliatory measures by other nations, U.S. 
restrictions would themselves deprive the economy of those advan-
tages that may be gained from foreign investment. To the extent 
that foreign direct investment is financed with funds from abroad, 
it helps to repatriate foreign-held dollars, contributes at least initially 
to the easing of balance-of-payments deficits, and, as pointed out 
above, tends to introduce new products and new technology 'into 
U.S. markets.60 
Traditionally, the United States has favored direct investment 
both domestically and abroad. A sudden reversal in policy would 
not only have serious adverse consequences but would also violate 
U.S. treaty obligations. In the remainder of this Note, existing 
treaties will be examined to determine the extent to which they 
permit the United States to reverse its policy on foreign investment 
in the United States. · 
58. See te.xt accompanying notes 123-50 infra for a discussion of the French and 
German controls. Many of our nontreaty-partners also have restrictions. See N.Y. Times, 
Nov. 27, 1973, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.), for a description of the recently enacted Canadian 
limitations, which require cabinet approval for foreign establishment or acquisition of 
any business having assets in excess of 250,000 dollars or having annual revenues ex-
ceeding 3 million dollars. The Canadian Foreign Investment Act, as reported to the 
House of Commons from one of its committees, is set out in full in 12 INTL. LEGAL 
MATERIALS 1136 (1973). It will become effective before June 12, 1974. Id: at 1546. 
59. E.g., Belgium-Luxembourg and The Netherlands. See note 173 infra. In 1972, 
U.S. direct investment in those two areas amounted to 2.1 billion dollars and 1.9 billion 
dollars respectively. Lupo, supra note 49, at 26, table SA. 
60. See Hein, supra note 5; note 55 supra. 
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The U.S. has concluded forty bilateral treaties that regulate the 
trade and investment relations of the signatory nations. These treaties 
are commonly referred to as treaties of friendship, commerce, and 
navigation, or "FCN treaties."61 They have great symbolic impor-
tance as tangible expressions of the friendly relations between the 
parties. Almost all of the treaties deal at a minimum with commer-
cial matters such as tariffs and the entrance of goods and ships into 
the territories of the parties. 62 Eleven of the most recent FCN treaties, 
including those concluded with such major U.S. investment partners 
as France, Germany, Japan, and The Netherlands, contain express 
assurances of the foreign investor's right freely to acquire shares in 
United States companies.63 This right is expressed in terms of na-
tional treatment. For example, the treaty with Germany provides: 
Nationals and companies£64l of either Party shall be accorded, 
within the territories of the other Party, national treatment with re-
spect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, financial and 
other activity for gain, whether in a dependent or an independent ca-
61. For general works on FCN treaties, see R. "\VII.SON, UNITED STATES COMMERCIAL 
TREATIES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (1960); Walker, Convention of Establishment Between 
the United States and France, 54 AM. J. INTL. L. 393 (1960); Walker, Modern Treaties 
of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 42 MINN, L. R.Ev. 805 (1958); Walker, Provi-
sions on Companies in United States Commercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INTL, L. 373 (1956); 
Walker, Treaties for the Encouragement and Protection of Foreign Investment: Present 
United States Practice, 5 AM. J. CoMP, L. 229 (1956); Wilson, A Decade of New Com-
mercial Treaties, 50 AM. J. INTL. L. 927 (1956). 
62. Only the French treaty does not include a provision on tariffs, but leaves the 
matter to be regulated by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. See Convention 
of Establishment with France, Nov. 25, 1959, [1960] 2 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S, No. 4625. 
63. Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Thailand, May 29, 1966, art, IV, 
paras. 1 &: 5, 11968] 5 U.S.T. 5843, T.I.A.S. No. 6540; Treaty of Amity and Economic 
Relations with Togo, Feb. 8, 1966, art. V, para. 1, [1967] 1 U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 6193; 
Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Luxembourg, Feb. 23, 1962, 
art. VI, para. 1, (1963] 1 U.S.T. 251, T.I.A.S. No. 5306; Convention with France, supra 
note 62, art. V, paras. l(b)-(c); Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular 
Rights with Muscat &: Oman, Dec. 20, 1958, art. V, para. 1, (1960] 2 U.S.T. 1835, T.I.A.S. 
No. 4530; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Republic of Korea, 
Nov. 28, 1956, art. VII, para. I, (1957] 2 U.S.T. 2217, T.I.A.S. No. 3947; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation with The Netherlands, March 27, 1956, art. VII, para, I, 
(1957] 2 U.S.T. 2043, T.I.A.S. No. 3942; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
with Nicaragua, Jan. 21, 1956, art. VII, para. I, (1959] U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S, No, 4024; 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Oct. 29, 1954, art, VII, para. 1, (1956) 2 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation with Japan, April 2, 1953, art. VII, para. I, (1953) 2 
U.S.T. 2063, T.I.A.S. No. 2863; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with 
Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, art. VII, para. I, [1954] 1 U.S.T. 550, T.I.A.S. No. 2948. 
64. "Company" is broadly defined so as to include all forms of enterprise: "As used 
in the present Treaty, the term 'companies' means corporations, partnerships, com• 
panies and other associations, whether or not with limited liability and whether or not 
for pecuniary profit. Companies constituted under the applicable laws and regulations 
within the territories of either Party shall be deemed companies thereof and shall have 
their juridical status recognized within the territories of the other Party." Treaty with 
the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. XXV, para. 5. 
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pacity, and whether directly or by agent or through the medium of 
any form of lawful juridical entity. Accordingly, such nationals and 
companies shall be permitted ,;vithin such territories: (a) to establish 
and maintain branches, agencies, offices, factories and other establish-
ments appropriate to the conduct of their business; (b) to organize 
companies under the general company laws of such other Party, and to 
acquire majority interests in companies of such other Party, and (c) 
to control and manage enterprises which they have established or 
acquired. Moreover, enterprises which they control, whether in the 
form of individual proprietorships, companies or othenvise, shall in 
all that relates to the conduct of the activities thereof, be accorded 
treatment no less favorable than that accorded like enterprises con-
trolled by nationals or companies of such other parties.65 
"National treatment" means that the federal government cannot 
impose more severe restrictions on the nationals of the other party 
than it does on its own citizens. 66 The individual states are not so 
bound; they are free to discriminate against out-of-state investors as 
long as they do not distinguish bet,;'leen out-of-state U.S. investors 
and treaty alien investors.67 While a nonfederal nation like France 
might seem to be in a better position to guarantee national treat-
ment for the treaty alien investor than is the United States, which 
must carefully observe states' rights,68 the formulation of "national 
65. Id., art. VII, para. I (emphasis added). 
66. E.g., id., art. XXV, para. 1: "The term 'national treatment' means treatment 
accorded within the territories of a Party upon terms no less favorable than the treat-
ment accorded therein, in like situations, to nationals, companies, products, vessels or 
other objects, as the case may be, of such Party." 
Although the national treatment clause emphasized in the text at note 65 supra 
expressly provides only for acquisition of "majority interests," an assurance of national 
treatment must implicitly include the right to acquire smaller interests. Majority owner-
ship in an enterprise may only be obtainable in some cases through piecemeal acquisition 
of small blocks of stocks, as in a public tender offer. In addition, since control of a 
company can often be achieved with less than majority ownership, the right to obtain 
a lesser equity interest in a company is as important to the foreign investor as the right 
to acquire majority interests. Without this lesser right, the assurance of the greater 
would be largely nugatory. Thus, subparagrapbs (a), (b), and (c} of that paragraph 
should be viewed as examples of when national treatment is appropriate and not as 
restricting national treatment to those specific situations. 
67. E.g., Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. XXV, 
para. 3: "National treatment accorded under the provisions of the present Treaty to 
companies of the Federal Republic of Germany shall, in any State, Territory, or pos-
session of the United States of America, be the treatment accorded therein to companies 
created or organized in other States, Territories, and possessions of the United States 
of America.'' A "treaty alien investor" is a citizen of one of the signatory nations desiring 
to invest within the territory of the other signatory nation. 
68. Under U.S. law, each state has constitutionally mandated prerogatives over the 
admission and regulation of out-of-state corporations and over the organization of 
companies incorporating within its borders. For discussions of how the "national treat-
ment" formula honors states' rights while offering valuable rights to foreign investors, 
see Walker, 42 MINN. L R.Ev. 805, supra note 61, at 818-19; Walker, 5 AM. J. COMP. L. 
229, supra note 61, at 232-33. 
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treatment" is acceptable to U.S. treaty partners because a state is 
unlikely to exercise its right to prevent out-of-state investors from 
controlling companies incorporated within its boundaries. States are 
loath to place restrictions on corporate organization that diminish 
their desirability as states of incorporation.60 Thus, foreign investors 
are granted significant benefits by the national treatment treaties: 
Their companies are, in practice, put on an equal footing with their 
U.S. competitors as far as both state and federal law is concerned. 
The broad commitment to national treatment embodied in these 
eleven FCN treaties is subject to express exceptions for certain types 
of vital activities. The treaties typically exclude "communications, 
air or water transport, taking and administering trusts, banking 
involving depository functions, or the exploitation of land and other 
natural resources"70 and activities involving precious metals, fission-
able materials, arms, and national fisheries71 from the guarantees on 
69. The recent spread of "liberal" Delaware-style incorporating statutes, see, e.g., 
MICH. CQMP. LA.ws ANN.§§ 1101-2099 (1973), shows this reluctance on the part of individ· 
ual states to regulate business at the risk of losing it to neighboring states. In fact, a num• 
ber of state governments are actively soliciting foreign investment. Illinois, Michigan, 
New York, and Virginia have permanent trade missions in Brussels. Alaska, Michigan, 
South Carolina, and Washington maintain representatives in Tokyo, and Illinois has a 
representative in Hong Kong. Hein, supra note 5. 
For an unusual example of a state statute that does attempt to regulate foreign 
ownership of one type of corporation, see TEX. R.Ev. CIV. SrAT, art. 1527 (1962), requiring 
that the majority ownership of stock in "international trading companies" incorporated 
in Te.xas be in the hands of Texans at all times. The statute expressly forbids non-U,S. 
citizens from gaining control of such a corporation. The statute surfaced in the court 
battle between CDC and Texasgulf, see note 4 supra, but was given a narrow interpre• 
tation by the court. See Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., CCH FED, SEC. L, REP. 
,r 94,160 at 99,689 (S.D. Tex. 1973). 
70. Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. VII, para. 2, 
In addition, the West German, Luxembourg, and Togolese treaties e.xempt the state• 
licensed professions. Id., Protocol, para. 8; Treaty with Luxembourg, supra note 63, 
Protocol, para. 5; Treaty with Togo, supra note 63, art. V, para. I. The treaty with 
Japan adds shipbuilding and public utilities to the list of e.xceptions. Treaty with Japan, 
supra note 63, art. VII, para. 2 &: Protocol, para. 3. The Korean treaty also adds public 
utilities, but the French treaty adds only the production of electricity, Treaty with 
Korea, supra note 63, art. VII, para. 2; Convention with France, supra note 62, art, V, 
para. 2. The treaty with Thailand adds domestic trade in indigenous agricultural prod• 
ucts. Treaty with Thailand, supra note 63, art. IV, para. 2, To some e.xtent, these vari• 
ations appear to reflect the special economic and political importance that the added 
activity has for the particular treaty partner. However, foreign ownership in these areas 
acquired prior to the effective date of the treaties is protected from the retroactive effect 
of any new restrictions that a signatory nation might enact. E.g., Treaty with the Fed• 
era! Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art VII, para. 2. 
71. E.g., Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. XXIV, 
para. I. These activities are excepted from all of the FCN treaty obligations, not just 
from the guarantees of national treatment in investment. The activities listed in the text 
accompanying note 70 supra are subject, at a minimum, to most-favored-nation treat• 
ment, e.g., id., art. VII, para. 4, which means that foreign investors shall receive treat• 
ment "no less favorable than the treatment accorded .•• to nationals [and] companies 
••• of any third country." Id., art. XXV, para. 4. The minimum required by the treaties 
with France and Luxembourg is set, not in terms of most-favored-nation treatment, but 
in terms of "equitable treatment." Treaty with Luxembourg, supra note 63, art. I: 
Convention with France, supra note 62, art. I. 
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the establishment and acquisition of companies. These "vital-activi-
ties" are thought to be so important to the political or economic life 
of a nation or to its defense that limitations on alien investment in 
them are justified. The exceptions represent a limited international 
consensus on the validity of the sociopolitical arguments favoring 
restrictions on foreign control of companies. Only one relatively 
minor treaty, which does not contain ' all the special exceptions, 
partially deviates from this consensus.72 
The broad promise of national treatment for the treaty alien 
investor may be further quaHfied by the protocols that accompany 
the treaties and provide a record of the understandings-particularly 
with regard to existing national law-under which the signatory 
parties entered into the treaties. Some of the protocols make no or 
only insubstantial amendments to the promise of national treat-
ment,73 but several protocols appear to make serious inroads into the 
general principle. The protocol to the French treaty may contain 
the greatest modification. Seeking to reconcile the principle of na-
tional treatment with the French exchange controls existing at the 
time of the making of the treaty, it authorizes each party to "subject 
to authorization the making of investments by foreign nationals and 
companies" in order to "[protect] its currency or facilitat[ e] the 
servicing of the proceeds of investments and the repatriation of 
capital."74 Since this qualification allows governmental "screening" 
of foreign investments, there is some question whether the principle 
of national treatment survives. The language of the protocol limits 
"screening" to certain purposes, but these purposes are phrased in 
vague terms and may fit any occasion. It is arguable that protection 
72. The treaty with Muscat and Oman does not contain the exceptions cited in the 
text accompanying note 70 supra, but it does contain those listed in the text accompany• 
ing note 71 supra. See Treaty with Muscat &: Oman, supra note 63, art. XI, para. 1. 
This deviation from the usual treaty pattern does cause some difficulties. See note 180 
infra and accompanying te. ... t. 
73. The protocol to the treaty with Japan, for example, allowed Japan to continue 
its existing restrictions on purchases with yen of shares in Japanese business for a 
three-year transitional period, which expired on April 2, 1956. Treaty with Japan, supra 
note 63, Protocol, para. 15. 
The protocol to the treaty with Luxembourg modifies the principle of national 
treatment in a way that could be thought to encroach seriously on the principle: It 
provides that Luxembourg may prohibit aliens from gainful activity in Luxembourg 
unless the "appropriate authorizations for access to and exercise of such activities have 
been granted." Treaty with Luxembourg, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 4. However, the 
protocol's further requirement that Luxembourg restrictions "be applied in a liberal 
fashion" in keeping with the promise of national treatment for U.S. investors, could 
indicate that Luxembourg may impose only restrictions of a formal nature, such as 
entry visa or registration requirements. For the purpose of the present discussion, this 
issue is moot since the qualification applies only to Luxembourg, not to the United 
States, 
74. Convention with France, supra note 62, Protocol, para. 14. There is no reference 
to liberal interpretation or to the principle of national treatment-as there is in the 
protocol to the treaty with Luxembourg, see note 73 supra-from which one could argue 
that the authorization requirement allowed by the protocol is only of a· formal nature. 
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of the nation's currency can justify "screening" only in times of 
extreme pressure on that currency. 75 This argument is consistent 
with article X of the treaty, which gives each party the right to im-
pose exchange controls only "to the extent necessary to prevent [that 
party's] monetary reserves from falling to a very low level or to 
effect a moderate increase in very low monetary reserves."76 This 
interpretation may be the only one that can accommodate screening 
and yet preserve some meaningful life for the principle of national 
treatment. However, the only effective protection against a fall in 
monetary reserves may be a policy of controlling foreign investment 
even when monetary reserves are high in order to strengthen the 
nation's industry and export capability. Controls imposed after re-
serves are depleted might be "too little, too late." The history of 
French screening of foreign investµient even in times of prosperity77 
and the absence of U.S. protest may indicate that this broad view has 
been accepted by the parties. 
A more limited screening of foreign investments is recognized 
in the protocols to other treaties,78 which allow the signatory nations 
to require prior governmental approval for the introduction of 
foreign capital. Again, the protocols require that this screening be 
used only to protect the nation's currency.70 Unlike the protocol to 
the French treaty, these protocols would apparently not permit 
screening of a foreign investor that raises capital within the country. 
To that extent they encroach less seriously on the principle of 
national treatment. Nor do some of the nations that are parties to 
these protocols-notably The Netherlands and Germany80-have a 
history of screening and U.S. acquiescence that may indicate the 
parties' acceptance of a greater inroad into the principle of national 
treatment. 
Like the protocols, various escape clauses in the eleven FCN 
treaties may modify the principle of national treatment. For ex-
ample, the treaties provide that a nation may take measures necessary 
to the preservation of international peace or national security.81 In 
75. This interpretation is considered in Toran &: Craig, Control of Foreign Invest-
ment in France, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 669, 708 (1968). 
76. Convention with France, supra note 62, art. X. 
77. See notes 130-50 infra and accompanying text for a description of the recent 
history of French controls. In an article published in 1968, Torem and Craig argued that 
the French currency reserves at that time were too strong to justify controls. Torem &: 
Craig, 66 MICH. L. REV. 669, supra note 75, at 708. 
78. See Treaty with Korea, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 7; Treaty with The Nether-
lands, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 14; Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, 
supra note 63, Protocol, para._ 16; Treaty with Japan, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 6. 
79. The provision in the protocol to the treaty with The Netherlands can also be 
inycked to prevent "serious monetary disturbances arising from speculative financial 
operations." Treaty with The Netherlands, supra note 63, Protocol, para. 14. 
80. See note 173 infra; text accompanying notes 123-24 infra. 
81. E.g., Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. XJOV, 
para. l(d). 
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addition, the restnct10ns imposed by the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade and by membership in the International Mone-
tary Fund are saved from any possible implied revocation.82 Finally, 
these treaties have fixed terms of at most ten years from the date at 
which they came into force. After this ten-year period they continue 
indefinitely but can be terminated upon one-year's ·written notice.83 
Since only the treaty ·with Thailand was still within its initial ten-
year term at the end of 1973,84 the bulk of the national~treatment 
treaties can be terminated within one year. 
The eleven national-treatment treaties represent the United 
States' most firm and most recent commitment to freedom in trans-
national investment. A group of four FCN treaties,85 most of which 
were concluded in the early 1950's do not go as far: They do not use 
the standard of "national . treatment" in defining the treaty alien 
investor's right to establish companies and to control companies that 
it has been permitted to acquire, and they do not expressly protect 
the right to acquire shares in existing domestic companies. Instead, 
these treaties appear to establish a nonrelative standard of treatment. 
Two of them-the treaties with Denmark .and Ireland-simply grant 
the right to organize companies.86 The others-those with Belgium 
and Greece-grant the right to organize companies "under the same 
conditions as nationals [and companies] of such other Party .... "87 
for specific purposes. While this language may seem very similar 
to that guaranteeing national treatment, the fact that national-
treatment language is used elsewhere in the two treaties may indicate 
that its omission here is significant.88 In so far as these four treaties 
82. E.g., id., art. XXIV, para. 4 & art. XII, para. 2. 
83. E.g., id., art. XXIX, para. 2. 
84. Of the most recently concluded treaties, the treaty with Thailand became effec-
tive on June 8, 1968, for a term of ten years, and the treaty with Togo went into effect 
on Feb. 5, 1967, but had a fixed term. of only five years. Treaty with Thailand, supra 
note 63, art. XIV, para. 3; Treaty with Togo, supra note 63, art. XV, para. 3. 
85. Treaty of Friendship, Establishment and Navigation with Belgium, Feb. 21, 1961, 
art. VI, paras. 1-2, [1963) 2 U.S.T. 1284, T.I.A.S. No. 5432; Treaty of Friendship, Com-
merce and Navigation with Denmark, Oct. 1, 1951, art. VIII, para. 1, [1961) 1 U.S.T. 
908, T.I.A.S. No. 4797; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Greece, 
Aug. 3, 1951, art. XIII, para. 1, [1954] 2 U.S.T. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty of Friend-
ship, Commerce and Navigation with Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, art. VI, para. 2, [1950) 
U.S.T. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155. The Treaty of Friendship, Reciprocal Establishments, 
Commerce and Surrender of Fugitive Criminals with Switzerland, Nov. 25, 1850, art. I, 
11 Stat. 587 (1859), T.S. No. 353, provides for the same treatment of treaty aliens in 
matters of establishment as is accorded citizens of the country but explicitly excepts 
from such treatment the acquisition of shares in companies that are not already partly 
owned by citizens of the other nation. 
86. Treaty with Denmark, supra note 85, art. VIII, para. l; Treaty with Ireland, 
supra note 85, art. VI, para. 2. 
87. Treaty with Belgium, supra note 85, art. 6, para. l; Treaty with Greece, supra 
note 85, art. XIII, para. 1. The bracketed language does not appear in the treaty with 
Belgium. 
88. See Walker, 50 AJ.r. J. INTL. L. 373, supra note 61, at 387 n.69, which asserts that 
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do not require identical treatment of national and treaty alien in-
vestors, they tolerate discrimination against the foreigner. Neverthe-
less, they appear to insist that the foreigner's right to establish 
subsidiaries not be effectively eliminated by restrictions on foreign 
investment. 89 
It may be possible to infer a right to acquire existing companies 
from the rights of establishment and control that are expressly 
granted by the four treaties. However, the language of the Greek 
and Danish treaties makes the inference difficult. The Greek treaty 
only accords national treatment to foreigners who wish to "engage" 
in certain specified activities. It omits from the list of protected 
activities the all-inclusive phrase, "other activity for gain," which is 
found in the eleven national-treatment treaties.00 The Danish treaty, 
which is similarly worded, also specifically reserves to each nation 
the right "to limit or prohibit .•. enterprises carrying on particular 
types of activities."91 The treaties with Belgium and Ireland are 
more ambiguous and may leave more room for an inferred right to 
acquire companies.92 In any case, all four treaties do express at least 
a limited commitment to free international investment. 
the Greek, Irish, and Danish treaties all establish a nonrelative standard. The treaty 
with Belgium was concluded after the article was written. 
89. Walker argues that the nonrelative standard is satisfied if there are "effective 
procedures" for foreign investment. Id. In a later article, the same author discusses 
the shortcomings of the definite standard for treatment of the foreign investor as a 
basis for bilateral treaties. Walker, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805, supra note 61, at 811-12. His 
observation that such a standard leads the signatory parties to make major e.xceptions in 
the protocols seems to be borne out by the four treaties. In addition to the somewhat 
uncertain promises described in the text, three of these treaties provide for a minhnum 
standard of "most-favored-nation treatment" for the establishment, acquisition, and 
control of domestic corporations. Treaty with Denmark, supra note 85, art. VII, para. 2; 
Treaty with Greece, supra note 85, art. XII, para. 2: Treaty with Ireland, supra note 85, 
art. III, para. 3. The only minimum standard set by the treaty with Belgium is one 
of "equitable treatment." Treaty with Belgium, supra note 85, art. I. 
90. Compare Treaty with Greece, supra note 85, art. XII, para. I with Treaty with 
the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. VII, para. I. 
91. Treaty with Denmark, supra note 85, art. XI, para. 2. 
92. The treaty with Ireland accords treaty aliens the right "to organize, control and 
manage companies for engaging in commercial, manufacturing and processing activities." 
Treaty with Ireland, supra note 85, art. VI, para. 2. It could be argued that such lan-
guage necessarily includes the right to acquire, because acquisition is a way to gain con-
trol. See Jordan v. Tashiro, 278 U.S. 123 (1928), which construed a clause in a treaty 
between Japan and the United States that authorized citizens of Japan "generally to do 
anything incident to and necessary for trade" to include within the scope of its protec-
tion the right to incorporate a hospital in the U.S. It should be pointed out that 
decisions of American courts are governed by the principle that U.S. treaty obligations 
should be construed liberally in order "to effect the apparent intention of the parties to 
secure equality and reciprocity between them." 278 U.S. at 127. Such an interpretative 
rule avoids putting the U.S. in a position of violating international law. The same prin-
ciple would not necessarily be used by an international tribunal in interpreting a U.S. 
treaty, since it declares what is international law. 
The right of U.S. investors to organize or acquire companies in Ireland is further 
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The rest of the United States' FCN treaties contain less protec-
tion for the treaty alien investor. About half of the remaining 
treaties promise only most-favored-nation treatment with regard to 
the organization of companies, the acquisition of shares, and the 
holding of executive position.93 These FCN treaties would allow the 
restricted by a provision sanctioning the continued application by Ireland of regulations 
not e.xceeding the severity of the Control of Manufactures Acts of 1932 and 1934. Treaty 
with Ireland, supra note 85, art. VI, para. 4 & Minutes of Interpretation ad art. VI, 
para. 4. ' 
The treaty with Belgium leaves the most room for argument for the existence of 
an implicit right to acquire companies on the same basis as a national, for it grants 
national treatment "with respect to engaging in all types of commercial, industrial, 
financial and other activity for gain." Treaty with Belgium, supra note 85, art. VI, 
para. 2. One could argue that this phrase includes investments by acquisition of shares-
plainly an activity for gain-at least in the fourth category, and that the treaties that 
follow that language with a sentence explicitly including the right to acquire are simply 
drafted in a more detailed manner but are not different in substance. Nevertheless, 
by comparison with the eleven treaties that do contain the more explicit language, 
many of which were concluded· in the decade before the conclusion of the Belgian 
treaty, the omission appears significant. The Belgian treaty also lacks any general 
provision according national treatment to the treaty alien in the acquisition of personal 
property, tangible or intangible, a provision that is generally present in those treaties 
containing an e.xpress right to acquire shares in national companies. Compare Treaty 
with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. IX, para. 2 with Treaty with 
Belgium, supra note 85. Thus, there also appear to be substantial grounds for the 
argument that the Belgian treaty was not intended to accord the treaty alien the right 
to acquire stock in companies of the other nation. 
93. Treaty of Friendship and Commerce with Pakistan, Nov. 12, 1959, art. VII, 
[1961] 1 U.S.T. 110, T.I.A.S. No. 4683; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 
with Italy, Feb. 2, 1948, art. III, 63 Stat. 2255 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1965; Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with China [Republic of China], Nov. 4, 1946, 
art. IV, 63 Stat. 1299 (1949), T.I.A.S. No. 1871; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation with Liberia, Aug. 8, 1938, art. XVIII, 54 Stat. 1739 (1941), T.S. No. 956; 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Finland, Feb. 13, 1934, 
art. XVII, 49 Stat. 2659 (1936), T.S. No. 868; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and 
Navigation with Austria, June 19, 1928, art. X, 47 Stat. 1876 (1933), T.S. No. 838; Treaty 
of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Nonvay, June 5, 1928, art. XIII, 
47 Stat. 2135 (1933), T .S. No. 852; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights 
with Latvia, April 20, 1928, art. XIV, 45 Stat. 2641 (1929), T.S. No. 765 (By a note to the 
Secretary of State dated July 11, 1951, the Charge d'Affaires of Latvia in Washington 
acquiesced in the application of controls to trade between the United States and Latvia 
while Latvia is under Soviet domination or control. See U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, TREATIES IN 
FORCE 151 (1973) ); Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights with Hon-
duras, Dec. 7, 1927, art. XIV, 45 Stat. 2618 (1929), T.S. No. 764; Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Consular Rights with Estonia, Dec. 23, 1925, art. Xm, 44 Stat. 2379 
(1926), T.S. No. 736 (By a note to the Secretary of State dated July 16, 1951, the Acting 
Consul General of Estonia in Charge of the Estonian Legation in New York acquiesced 
in the application of controls to trade between the United States and Estonia while 
Estonia is under Soviet domination or control. U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra, at 75). 
A few treaties contain no mention of a right for treaty aliens to acquire shares of the 
other nation's companies but do include a provision guaranteeing at least most-favored-
nation treatment for treaty aliens in the acquisition of "personal property of all kinds." 
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran, Aug. 15, 1955, 
art. V, [1957) I U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853; Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations 
with Ethiopia, Sept. 7, 1951, art. IX, [1953) 2 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864; Treaty of 
Commercial Relations with Serbia [Yugoslavia), Oct. 2 & 14, 1881, art. II, 22 Stat. 963 
(1883), T.S. No. 319. Such a provision would seem to include the right to acquire a 
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United States to enact restrictions against all foreign investment, but 
they do prohibit restrictions on investors from the signatory nations 
when such restrictions are not imposed on investors from other 
foreign countries.94 Like most of the eleven "national treatment" 
FCN treaties, these treaties are all now terminable upon one year's 
notice.95 
The other half of the remaining FCN treaties date principally 
from an even earlier period, before the facilitation of U.S. direct 
investment abroad became a major goal of U.S. treaty policy,00 so 
they do not deal explicitly with investment activity. Most impose 
a most-favored-nation commitment on the parties in matters of "com-
merce."97 The term "comm~rce" is not defined, but the scope of the 
items expressly covered (e.g., tariffs, entry of ships into harbors, and 
commercial travelers) indicates that "commerce" refers principally 
to matters of trade between the signatory nations, and not to invest-
ment involving stock o,mership.98 Some of the treaties are even more 
vague.99 A few treaties that do not grant national treatment to the 
share in a company, since a share is simply a type of intangible personal property. How• 
ever, the very absence of a special provision regarding stock casts some doubt on the 
scope of the general provision. 
The treaty with Turkey is even more vague in its promise of most-favored-nation 
treatment with regard to "conditions of establishment and sojourn," without definition 
of those terms. Treaty of Establishment and Sojourn with Turkey, Oct. 28, 1931, art. 
I, 47 Stat. 2432 (1933), T.S. No. 859. 
94. E.g., Treaty with Pakistan, supra note 93, art. VII, para. 2. 
95. E.g., id., art. XXIV, para. 3. 
96. Walker, 42 MINN. L. REv. 805, supra note 61, at 807. 
97. Agreement Respecting Friendship and Commerce with Yemen [San'a], May 4, 
1946, art. III, 60 Stat. 782 (1946), T.I.A.S. No. 1535; Treaty of Friendship and General 
Relations with Spain, July 3, 1902, art. II, 33 Stat. 2105 (1905), T.S. No. 422; Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Paraguay, Feb. 4, 1859, art. III, 12 Stat. 
1091 (1863), T.S. No. 272; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Bolivia, 
May 13, 1858, art. II, 12 Stat. 1003 (1863), T.S. No. 32; Treaty of Friendship, Commerce 
and Navigation with Argentina, July 27, 1853, art. III, 10 Stat. 1005 (1855), T.S. No. 4; 
Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Costa Rica, July 10, 1851, art. 
III, 10 Stat. 916 (1855), T.S. No. 62; Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce and Naviga-
tion with Bruni, June 23, 1850, art. II, 10 Stat. 909 (1855), T.S. No. 33; Treaty of Peace, 
Amity, Navigation and Commerce with Colombia, Dec. 12, 1846, art. II, 9 Stat. 881 
(1851), T.S. No. 54. 
98. See also Treaty with Denmark, supra note 85, Minutes of Interpretation ad 
arts. VII &: VIII: "The word 'commercial' relates primarily but not exclusively to the 
buying and selling of goods and activities incidental thereto." It is not clear whether 
this definition merely restates the commonly accepted meaning of "commerce" in 
international law or whether the fact that this treaty included a specific definition indi-
cates that the commonly accepted meaning is either unsettled or much broader. 
99. Agreement Respecting Friendship and Commerce with Nepal, April 25, 1947, 
para. 6, 61 Stat. 2566 (1947), T .I.A.S. No. 1585 (providing for most-favored-nation 
treatment "in respect of their rights''); Treaty of Commerce and Navigation with the 
United Kingdom, July 3, 1815, 8 Stat. 228 (1845), T.S. No. 110, continued in force, 
Convention Continuing in Force Indefinitely the Convention of July 3, 1815, Aug. 
6, 1827, 8 Stat. 361 (1945), T.S. No. 117 (proclaiming the principle of "liberty of 
commerce" but providing in fact only for most-favored-nation treatment for duties). 
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foreign investor do expressly protect from retroactive legislation any 
ownership rights in a domestic company that the treaty alien has 
been permitted to establish or acquire.100 
Only in recent years has the United States negotiated treaties 
that commit both parties to national treatment of the treaty alien 
investor. Some major investment partners, such as Great Britain and 
Canada, have no such treaties with the United States. Nevertheless, 
among the eleven nations covered by the recent treaties101 are many 
major investment partners, such as Germany, France, The Nether-
lands, and Japan. Although the eleven national-treatment treaties 
contain numerous exceptions, they impose a mutual obligation to 
refrain from enacting general restrictions on foreign investment. In 
addition, the four treaties that use a nonrelative standard of treat-
ment represent a similar commitment.102 The treaty with Belgium-
an important investment partner-falls into this category. Also, the 
most-favored-nation treaties require that any exemptions from 
general restrictions be extended to investors from those ten signa-
tory nations.103 Thus, in total, the United States is prohibited by 
bilateral treaties ·with over ~venty nations from enacting general 
restrictions against direct investment from those nations. 
The United States has been reluctant to use multilateral treaties 
for agreements on transnational investment because of the special 
concerns of developing nations and has preferred instead to rely on 
bilateral FCN treaties.104 Nevertheless, the United States is a party 
to one multilateral agreement on investment, the Gode of Liberalisa-
tion of Capital Movements (Code),105 as a consequence of its member-
ship in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD).108 All of the United States' major investment and 
trading partners are members of OECD, and all except Canada have 
adhered to the Code.107 
100. E.g., Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations with Vietnam, April 3, 1961, art. 
V, [1961] 2 U.S,'I'., 1703, T.I.A.S. No. 4890; Agreement Supplementing the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation of Feb. 2, 1948, with Italy, Sept. 26, 1961, [1961] 
1 U.S.T. 131, T.I.A.S. No. 4685. 
101. These treaties are listed in note 63 supra. 
102. These treaties are listed in note 85 supra. 
103. These treaties are listed in note 93 supra. In addition, three of the nonrelative 
treaties have a minimum standard of most-favored-nation treatment. See note 89 supra. 
104. Walker, 5 AM. J. CoMP. L. 229, supra note 61, at 240-43. 
105. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, CODE OF LIBERAL-
ISATION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS (1969) [hereinafter CODE]. 
106. Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation anil Deve\opment, 
Dec. 14, 1960, [1961] 2 U.S.T. 1728, T.I.A.S. No. 4891 [hereinafter OECD Convention]. 
107. The following states are members of the OECD: Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
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_Although it is not in the form of a treaty,108 the Code apparently 
has the force of a treaty under international law. The Code is an act 
of the Council of the OECD. According to the convention establish-
ing the OECD, such an act is, subject to certain exceptions, binding 
on the members that voted for it.100 One of the exceptions provides 
that "[n Jo decision shall be binding on any Member until it has com-
plied with the requirements of its own constitutional procedures."110 
The Code was not specifically consented to by the Senate, as the 
United States Constitution requites with regard to treaties. However, 
senatorial consent is probably not needed in this case since the execu-
tive action that binds the U.S. through a vote in the Council appears 
to be authorized by the convention establishing the OECD.111 Even 
108. The Code does not bear the signatures of the representatives of those nations 
that adhere to it. 
109. OECD Convention, supra note 106, arts. 6 &: 7. 
110. Id., art. 6, para. 3. The Senate emphasized this understanding by advising and 
consenting "'with the interpretation and explanation of the intent of the Senate that 
nothing in the convention ••• confers any power on the E."ecutive to bind the United 
States in substantive matters beyond what the Executive now has, or to bind the 
United States without compliance with applicable procedures imposed by domestic 
law •••• " [1961] 2 U.S.T. 1751. This understanding was attached to the senatorial 
consent following the submission to the Committee on Foreign Relations of a memo• 
randum from the Legal Adviser to the State Department, Abram Chayes, to the same 
effect. Hearings on the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development Before 
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 87th C:ong., 1st Sess. 118-19 (1961). 
111. Article II, section 2, of the U.S. Constitution authorizes the President to make 
treaties with foreign nations, with the advice and consent of the Senate, but e."ecutive 
agreements-international agreements entered into solely by e."ecutive action-have, in 
fact, been a form used by U.S. presidents to make binding international commitments 
since the founding of this nation. Under international law the e."ecutive agreement is 
as binding as a treaty that has receiyed senatorial consent. While U.S. domestic law 
distinguishes in theory between those obligations that can only be assumed by the 
United States through the treaty process and those that can be made through e.xecutive 
agreements, the line is far from clear. See 5 G. HACKWORTII, DIGEsr OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 397-98 (1943). 
An executive agreement entered into pursuant to a treaty that was consented to by 
the Senate is not unusual. See id. at 397. The Convention establishing the OECD, supra 
note 106, which did receive the Senate's consent, authorized the voting procedure 
whereby the U.S. became bound to the Code under the rules of the OECD. Thus, the 
executive action in voting for the Code appears to be sufficient to bind the United 
States under both international and domestic law. The argument that the Code entails a 
specificity of obligation that is not authorized by the OECD Convention lacks merit in 
light of the many deviations permitted by the Code from its principal obligations. See 
note 121 infra and text accompanying notes 115-20 infra, Since the obligation ultimately 
imposed on the U.S. by the Code scarcely seeIDS more specific than the general principle 
expressed by the OECD Convention (article 2 of the Convention, supra note 106, reads 
in part: "the Members agree that they will ••• (d) pursue their efforts to ••• maintain 
and extend the liberalization of capital movements."), the executive action of voting for 
the Code in the OECD Council should be sufficient to satisfy U.S. law. 
The problem of U.S. federalism is also expressly dealt with by the Code. By special 
act, the Council decided that "[t]he provisions of the Code shall not apply to action 
by a State of the United States which comes within the jurisdiction of that State." 
CoDE, supra 105, Annex C, para. 1. The Council of the OECD e."prcssed the belief that 
actions by individual states of the United States "are unlikely to have a significant 
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if irregularities under U.S. law are conceded, the reliance of the 
other signatory nations upon the appearance of regularity is reason-
able given the uncertain nature of American law: on this point and 
makes the Code binding under international law.112 
Article 1 of the Code imposes a general obligation on each signa-
tory nation to liberalize its policies toward transactions and money 
transfers necessary for direct investment.113 The specific measures of 
liberalization called for in Article 2 include the abolition of all con-
trols on the organization, acquisition, or control of domestic com-
panies by treaty aliens.114 The obligation of liberalization °is subject, 
however, to flexible qualifications. Perhaps the most sweeping of 
these allows certain transactions or transfers to be restricted if "[i]n 
view of the amount involved or of other factors a specific transaction 
or transfer would have an exceptionally detrimental effect on the in-
terests of the Memb~r concerned."115 This provision would seem to 
contemplate and approve the use of pre-investment screening, de-
spite the commitment expressed in article 2.116 
The other major qualification of the Code's obligation to liberal-
ize is found in the clauses of derogation,117 which authorize member 
nations to refrain from liberalization for various "economic and fi-
nancial" reasons. Even measures of liberalization taken after adher-
ence to the Code may be revoked, despite a general exhortation 
against backsliding.118 Several provisions seek to restrict the use of 
practical effect on the operation of the Code." Id. This is the same reasoning that was 
suggested as an explanation of the willingness of the U.S.'s bilateral-treaty partners 
to enter into a treaty that apparently binds a federal nation to a lesser degree than it 
does a nonfederal nation. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. 
112. The customary international law is codified in article 46 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, reprinted in 63 AM J. INTL. L. 875, 890 (1969). 
According to that article, a state is bound by a treaty made in violation of a nation's 
internal law "unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal 
law of fundamental importance." See also 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 887-90 
(H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955); 2 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAw 1385 (2d ed. 1945); RE-
srATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 123 (1965). Senate consent might be con-
sidered a requirement of fundamental importance, but, "since no one can say with 
certainty when it is required," it can be argued that failure to use the treaty form 
including senatorial consent cannot be a "manifest" violation of our Constitution. 
L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 427 n.21 (1972). 
Continental writers have assumed that the Code constitutes a properly binding 
international obligation. See, e.g., P. JASINSKI, supra note 17, at 71; Hahn, Die Organisa-
tion fur Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit ~nd Entwicklung-Das Wirtschaftsrecht des 
P'erbandes und seine Systematik, 13 AB.CHIV DES VoLKERRECHTs 153, 267-68 (1967). 
113. CODE, supra note 105, art. 1. ) 
114. Id., art. 2 &: Annex A (I). 
115. Id., Annex A (I), remarks (ii). 
116. The exception has been used. See text accompanying notes 123-50 infra for a 
description of French and German screening controls. 
117. CODE, supra note 105, art. 7. 
118. Id., art. 1, para. e &: art. 7, para. e. 
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the clauses of derogation. Thus, the member nation that invokes a 
clause of derogation must "endeavor" to comply with Article 2 
within eighteen months.119 Furthermore, it must notify the OECD 
of its reasons for derogating.120 The OECD can then determine the 
sufficiency of the nation's claims and, through periodic review, evalu-
uate its progress back to full compliance. However, the most the 
OECD can do with a recalcitrant member is to "remain in consulta-
tion" with it and, after a reasonable period of time, assemble a "spe-
cial Ministerial Group" to examine the situation.121 
Thus,ethe Code clearly states a policy of liberalization to which 
all member states are committed in principle and contains elaborate 
provisions for bringing representatives of the member states together 
to consult about related problems. A nation that fails to liberalize or 
that enacts new restrictions does not necessarily breach its Code ob-
ligations. A breach in the technical sense probably would occur only 
if a nation derogated from the Code in bad faith and gave only friv-
olous reasons or none at all in justification for its action. However, 
to acknowledge that the Code's legal effect is diffuse is not to imply 
that it lacks political importance.122 The Code's general provisions 
on liberalization stand as an important statement of policy to which 
the United States has subscribed. Any legislation that is now enacted 
contrary to that policy must be justified in world forums. 
In order to examine the restrictions on investment that have been 
imposed by other members of the world community and to see how 
existing treaty obligations have been interpreted abroad, the con-
trols of two nations-the Federal Republic of Germany and France 
-that are members of the OECD and have national-treatment FCN 
treaties with the United States will be described in some detail. 
Until June of 1973, the government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany had followed a policy clearly consistent with the wording 
of the FCN treaty that it had concluded with the United States. The 
German Foreign Trade Law of 1961 expressed the general principle 
that capital, exchange, and trade movements in and out of the Fed-
119. Id., art. 7, para. d(ii). 
120. Id., art. 13, para. a. 
121. Id., art. 13, para. f. The Code also provides an escape clause very similar to 
that of the FCN treaties for actions necessary for "essential security interests" and 
international peace and security. Id., art. 3. In addition, each member nation is allowed 
to adhere to the Code with reservations, which permits each nation to tailor the obliga-
tions of article 2 to fit its individual system of controls. The U.S. used this opportunity 
to except from article 2 many of those activities such as fresh water shipping, radio 
communications, air transport, costal shipping, hydroelectric power production, and 
the production or utilization of atomic energy, also e.xcepted from "national treatment" 
under most of the FCN treaties. Id., Annex B, United States, list A, I/A. 
122. While the obligations of the Code are clearly not self-executing in that they do 
not directly affect the internal law of a member state, they exercise continuous "political 
pressure" on the member states to adopt measures of liberalization. P. JASINSKI, supra 
note 17, at 79. 
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eral Republic should be free, although it also gave the German gov-
ernment the power to restrict the purchase of German securities by 
nonresidents.123 Until March of 1972 no restrictions were imposed 
on the exchange of foreign currencies or on the acquisition by for-
eigners or nonresidents of German securities. At that time the Ger-
man government determined that one of the principal causes of the 
serious inflation that plagued its economy was the large inflow of for-
eign capital.124 Therefore, the government decreed exchange controls 
designed to raise the cost of borrowing from nonresidents.125 The ef-
fect of these measures was apparently not satisfactory, and in June of 
1973 the government decreed even broader restrictions. The ap-
proval of the Bundesbank is required for the transfer for considera-
tion to nonresidents by residents of treasury notes, bank drafts, stocks 
and bonds issued by companies resident in Germany, and claims 
against residents payable in German marks.126 The new measure 
also requires Bundesbank approval for the direct or indirect borrow-
ing of DM 50,000 or more by residents from nonresidents,127 and for 
capital contributions of DM 500,000 or more by nonresidents to an 
enterprise or branch of a company resident in Germany.128 Any vio-
lation can lead to a penalty of up to DM 50,000.129 It is too early to 
say how chary the Bundesbank will be in granting approvals. It is 
clear, however, that these new measures purport to give the German 
government substantial discretion in choosing which direct invest-
ments, if any, will be allowed into the country. This is a substantial 
departure from the concept of "national treatment" embodied in the 
FCN treaty concluded between Germany and the U.S. It is also a 
departure from the principle of liberalization called for by the Code 
of Liberalisation of Capital Movements. 
France130 has had a much more extensive history, dating back to 
1939, of controls over foreign investment.131 Until 1966, restrictions 
123. Law of April 28, 1961, §§ 1, 23(1)(4), [1961] Bundesgesetzblatt I [BGBI.] 481, 487. 
124. See CCH COMMON MARKET REP., DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE ,r,r 23,115-24 (1972-
1973), for a more extensive economic history. 
125. The restrictions applied only to fixed-interest obligations of more than DM 2 
million and required the German borrower to place 40 per cent of the borrowed capital 
in an interest-free account with the Bundesbank for at least one month. The approval 
of the Bundesbank was also required for the sale of these fixed-interest obligations to 
nonresidents. Decree of March 1, 1972, [1972] BGBl. 213, 217. The limit on the size 
of the loans so restricted was later lowered to DM 500,000 and the percentage required 
to be held on deposit was raised to 50 per cent. Regulation of June 29, 1972, [1972] 
BGBI. 995. 
126. Regulation of June 14, 1973, [1973] BGBI. 565. 
127. Regulation of June 14, 1973, § 1, [1973] BGBI. 565. 
128. Regulation of June 14, 1973, § 1, [1973] BGBI. 566. 
129. Law of April 28, 1961, § 34, [1961] BGBI. 489. 
130. See Torem & Craig, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 669, supra note 75; Torem & Craig, De-
velopments in the Control of Foreign Investment in France, 70 MICH. L. REv. 285 (1971). 
131. Torem & Craig, 66 MICH. L. R.Ev. 669, supra note 75, at 669. 
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were imposed through a complex structure of exchange regula-
tions.132 The Law of December 28, 1966,133 abolished these regula-
tions and declared that "[f]inancial relations between France and 
other countries are free."134 However, the 1966 law gave the execu-
tive the power to regulate by decree investment by nonresidents in 
France, French investment abroad, and foreign exchange operations, 
if necessary to defend the national interest.136 
The executive power was immediately invoked, by Decree No. 
67-78 of January 27, 1967,186 to erect an entirely new set of controls, 
which required prior declaration of all nonresident direct invest-
ments and prior authorization of all loans and other financing ex-
tended by nonresidents. The new controls apply to private persons 
whose habitual residence is outside of France, to companies whose 
headquarters (siege) are outside of France, and to companies or 
branches in France but under foreign control.137 The decree follows 
common economic usage in relating the concept of direct investment 
to control,138 but it does not define the term "control."130 Even the 
purchase of a relatively small amount of capital participation could, 
if coupled with options, loans, patents or licensing agreements, or 
contracts, constitute the acquisition of control.140 If a financial opera-
tion is determined to be a direct investment, the investor must make 
a declaration of the proposed transaction to the Ministry of Finance, 
upon pain of criminal penalties.141 Within two months, the Ministry 
can require that the investment be postponed, but postponement can 
continue indefinitely and may ripen with time into an effective pro-
hibition of the ttansaction.142 A 1971 amendment exempted residents 
132. Id. at 670-73. 
133. Law No. 66-1008, [1966] J.O. 11621, [1967] B.L.D. 26. 
134. Law No. 66-1008, Dec. 28, 1966, art. 1, [1966] J.O. 11621, [1967] B.L.D. 27, 
135. Law No. 66-1008, Dec. 28, 1966, art. 3, [1966] J.O. 11622, [1967] B.L.D, 27. 
136. [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] B.L.D. 126, 
137. Decree No. 67-78, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4(1), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] B.L.D. 127•28, 
138. A "direct investment" is defined by this decree to include the purchase, creation 
or expansion of any business or branch and all "operations which alone or together 
,vith others, concurrently or consecutively, have the effect of permitting one or more 
persons to acquire or increase the control of a company ••• , whatever may be its form, 
or to assure the expansion of such company already controlled by them." Decree No. 
67-78, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2(3)(b), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] B.L.D. 127 (emphasis added), 
For a detailed discussion of this definition, see Torem &: Craig, 66 MICH, L. REv. 669, 
supra note 75, at 682-87. 
139. The decree does give one hint. It excludes from the definition of "direct in-
vestment" the sole acquisition of 20 per cent or less of the stock of a company quoted on 
a French stock exchange. Decree No. 67-78, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 2(3), [1967] J.O. 1073, 
[1967] B.L.D. 127. Administrative practice has applied a strict interpretation, Torem &: 
Craig, 66 MICH. L. REv. 669, supra note 75, at 684-87. 
140. Torem &: Craig, 66 MICH. L. REv. 669, supra note 75, at 685-86. 
141. Law No. 66-1008, Dec. 28, 1966, art. 5, [1966] J.O. 11622, [1967] B.L.D, 27. 
142. See Decree No. 67-78, Jan. 27, 1967, art. 4(1), [1967] J.O. 1073, [1967] B.L.D, 128, 
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of nations in the European Economic Community from these direct 
investment controls.143 
However, all nonresident investors-including those from Com-
mon Market nations-are subject to discretionary government action 
under the exchange controls,144 which were reinstituted in 1971. 
These exchange control regulations145 require prior declaration for 
all "direct investments" and prior authorization for all financial 
operations that "are susceptible of causing a movement of capital." 
Most "direct investments" fall into the latter category. Since the 
prior declaration required by the exchange controls, unlike that re-
quired by the direct investment controls, does not carry with it the 
possibility of postponement, only direct inves,tments that are not 
"susceptible of causing a movement of capital" and are made by 
residents of Common Market nations are free of French government 
control.146 The postponement provisions of the January 27, 1967, 
decree147 continue to apply to investments from the United States 
and other non-Common Market nations wherever the new exchange 
controls do not. 
The French investment and exchange controls, like the German 
controls, purport to give the government a large amount of discre-
tion to exclude foreign investment. This discretion, if exercised, may 
be contrary to both the Franco-American FCN treaty and the Code. 
The French controls were designed to counter American acquisi-
tions, which are perceived as the main threat to French ownership of 
French industry.148 Nevertheless, only a few of the hundreds of dec-
larations of foreign investment made each year are rejected.149 Most 
rejections involve situations in which large U.S. corporations attempt 
to buy into French companies in sectors of the economy that the gov-
143. Decree No. 71-143, Feb. 22, 1971, [1971] J.O. 1832, [1971] B.L.D. 128. 
144. Decree No. 68-1021, Nov. 24, 1968, [1968] J.O. 11081, [1968] B.L.D. 575. 
145. Decree No. 71-144, Feb. 22, 1971, [1971] J.O. 1832, [1971] B.L.D. 128. 
146. Decree No. 68-1021, Nov. 24, 1968, [1968] J.O. 11081, [1968] B.L.D. 575. Where 
the direct investment from other Common Market nations is not likely to cause a 
movement of capital, the prior declaration serves statistical purposes only. 
147. See text accompanying note 142 supra. 
148. Torem &: Craig, 70 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 285, supra note 130, at 316-18. Although the 
government's guidelines for approving or not opposing new investments are informal 
and unpublished, the authors distill from past practice the following factors, which are 
regularly taken into account: on the favorable side of the ledger, a positive contribution 
to French balance of payments, the establishment of a new company as opposed to a 
takeover, technological contributions to the French economy, competition in a sector 
of the economy suffering from lack of competition, the aiding of France's over-all 
economic plan and decentralization policy, and French participation in the corporate 
decision-making process; and, on the unfavorable side, domination of a sector of the 
economy, interference with an industry of special interest to the French government, 
and excessive investment in sensitive French border areas. Id. at 318-24. 
149. Id. at 324. 
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ernment is especially concerned to strengthen or to keep in French 
hands.150 
The controls adopted in France and Germany contrast sharply 
with the Dent-Gaydos proposal, both in severity and flexibility. Gov-
ernment screening in France and Germany does not prevent all for-
eign direct investment. Rather, it allows a governmental agency to 
channel foreign investment, on a case-by-case basis, into particular 
sectors of the economy. The Dent-Gaydos proposal, on the other 
hand, would flatly forbid foreign ownership of stock beyond a cer-
tain very low percentage. No new foreign direct investment would 
be permitted,151 and even portfolio holdings that exceed the percent-
age limit would be barred.152 Furthermore, no distinction would be 
made benv-een foreign investment in industries where it would be 
beneficial and foreign investment in industries where it is especially 
undesirable. 
The possibility that the U.S. response to foreign direct invest-
ment should not be as extensive as that proposed by the Dent-Gaydos 
bill and should at least be limited to the type of controls employed 
150. A number of these cases have been reported in the literature, In February 
1964, the French government opposed General Electric's (GE) bid to take a minority 
interest (20 per cent) in Compagnie des Machines Bull (Bull), the largest French-owned 
computer company. The government wanted to find a "French" solution to the com-
pany's financial problems in order to save this vital sector of the economy from foreign 
control. It succeeded in the short term by substituting a group of French lenders for 
GE, but the French efforts were unable to solve Bull's long-range problems, In November 
of 1964 the Minister of Finance approved a new plan for GE participation at a much 
higher percentage than originally proposed (ultimately 66 per cent) when French in-
terests failed to respond to, calls for more capital. See generally Landon, Franco-Ameri-
can Joint Ventures in France: Some Problems and Solutions-The Compagnie des 
Machines Bull-General Electric Venture as an Illustrative Example, 7 HARV. INTL, L. 
Cum J. 238 (1966); Torem &: Craig, 70 MICH. L. REv. 285, supra note 130, at 324-26. 
Torem and Craig also describe several other major American investments, which have 
been blocked more successfully by the French government, including Westinghouse's 
1968 bid to acquire the leading French heavy electrical equipment manufacturer, 
Jeumont-Schneider; Leasco's bid in 1969 to obtain a 20 per cent interest in the French 
computer software company, SEMA; ITT's 1968 attempt to gain control of pump 
manufacturer, Pompes Guinard, in a sector of the French economy where ITT already 
controlled another French company; a 1970 bid by Helena Rubenstein, Inc,, to purchase 
80 per cent of Parfums Rochas; a 1970 proposal by H.J. Heinz to acquire Grey Poupon, 
a Dijon mustard manufacturer; and a 1970 bid by General Foods Corporation to acquire 
Orangina, the large French soft drink company. In each of these cases the Frencl1 
government was able to find a French, or at least a Common Market, solution to the 
financial problems of the French "target" company. Torem &: Craig, 70 MICH, L, REv, 
285, supra, at 326-33. 
151. See H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973); H.R. 11265, 93d Cong,, 1st Sess. 
§ 3 (1973). Direct investment would be possible if control of a company could be ob-
tained with less than five per cent of the voting stock or by some other method, or if 
several foreign investors were willing to cooperate so as to aggregate their individual 
interests to achieve joiht control. 
152. See H.R. 8951, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1973); H.R. 11265, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, § 3 
(1973). In choosing the figure of five per cent as the ma.ximum allowable foreign owner-
ship of voting stock, the Dent-Gaydos proposal is considerably more conservative than 
the econometricians at, the Department of Commerce. See note 49 supra. 
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abroad raises the question of whether the French or German method 
of controlling foreign investments could be adopted in the U.S. While 
the French have a long tradition of government control over foreign 
investments and over the economy in general, the United States has 
relatively little experience with over-all economic planning by the 
government. It may be difficult to create a mechanism to formulate 
national policy on foreign investment in such a way that all the ap-
propriate interest groups are heard. The problem of consulting the 
public is not insoluble; agency hearings are already employed to de-
cide policy on many issues. But American · experience with public 
agencies has also indicated that regulatory agencies tend to become 
the servants of the industries that they are established to regulate.153 
If the U.S. is to reverse its long-standing open-door policy toward 
foreign investment it should do so without violating its obligations 
under international law. The existence of the French and German 
restrictions may support the United States' right to enact similar re-
strictions in either of two ways: If they are not violations of interna-
tional law, the United States is free to enact similar controls. If they 
are violations of international law, the controls imposed by France 
and Germany may be used to argue that their treaties with the 
United States have been breached and the United States has been 
released from its obligations. 
It seems clear that the controls do not violate the obligations of 
the Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements, at least in a tech-
nical sense, since the Code provides amply for derogations. It is 
equally clear, however, that they do derogate from the general com-
mitment expressed in the Code. 
If the concept of "national treatment" is to be given any meaning 
at all, the controls would also appear to violate the French and Ger-
man FCN treaties. The French and the Germans could raise techni-
cal defenses to argue that their controls comply with the treaties: 
Both sets of controls apply, not to noncitizen investors, but only to 
"nonresidents." The German controls, for example, apply equally 
to nonresident German investors and to nonresident U.S. investors. 
Similarly, an American individual who lives in the Federal Republic 
or a German subsidiary of a U.S. corporation would escape the regu-
lations, as would resident West Germans.154 However, since most 
United States investors-those who did not have a German subsid-
iary when the controls were instituted or who wish to invest in-
dependently of their German subsidiaries-are treated differently 
153. See Hearings on Monopoly Problems in Regulated Industries Before the Sub-
comm. on Antitrust of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1956) 
(statement of Marver H. Bernstein). As a result, such an agency could stifle competition 
and its handmaidens, innovation and efficiency. 
154. See Law of April 28, 1961, §§ 4(1)3-4, [1961] BGBI. 481. 
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from most German investors-those who are German residents-the 
regulations, in practice, constitute a departure from the principle of 
national treatment. The French restrictions also apply to "nonresi-
dents," but they go beyond the German controls in that they apply to 
companies owned or controlled by foreign investors.llill Therefore, 
they do not even arguably comply with the provision for national 
treatment. 
It is more reasonable to argue that the French and German con-
trols are permitted by the protocols156 to the respective treaties. 
While the German controls were enacted for the purpose allowed by 
the protocol-protection of German currency from the inflationary 
influx of foreign capital-the 1973 controls go beyond the protocol, 
which contemplated restrictions only on the introduction of foreign 
capital and not on all purchases of German securities.11i7 The French 
protocol contemplates more extensive screening of investments, but 
only if necessitated by the weakness of the French currency.11i8 
If the French and German controls do constitute a technical in-
road on the FCN treaties, this inroad may be de minimus, and there-
fore no violation of international Iaw.100 Under the French controls, 
for example, a substantial amount of U.S. investment has been ad-
mitted into France.160 However, the small number of rejected or 
"postponed" investment proposals may not accurately reflect the ex-
tent of deviation from the principle of national treatment, for the 
very existence of the French controls probably deters some Ameri-
cans from investing in France. 
Even if the French and German controls are not violations of 
their FCN treaty obligations, similar cont~ols instituted by the 
United States would breach other FCN treaties, the protocols of 
which do not provide for screening.161 Nor could the U.S. institute 
blanket restrictions, such as those proposed by the Dent-Gaydos bill, 
under the protocols to the French and German treaties.162 
155. See text accompanying note 137 supra. 
156. See notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text. . 
157. See Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, Protocol, 
para. 16. 
158. See notes 74-77 supra and accompanying text. 
159. For example, the Germans might argue that under paragraph 3 of article VII 
of their FCN treaty their regulations on foreign investment are permissible "formali-
ties in connection with the establishment of alien-controlled enterprises." See Treaty 
with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. VII, para. 3. However, if gov• 
ernmental authorization is not automatically forthcoming for each investment, then the 
controls are clearly more than "formalities" and violate the injunction of that treaty 
paragraph against impairing the substance of national treatment. 
160. See Table 6 supra; text accompanying note 149 supra. 
161. See, e.g., Treaty with Luxembourg, supra note 63; Treaty with Muscat &: Oman, 
supra note 63. 
162. See Convention with France, supra note 62; Treaty with the Federal Republic 
of Germany, supra note 63. 
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Moreover, it is not clear that French and German breaches, if 
they exist, excuse the United States from its similar obligations. The 
doctrine that the breach of a provision of a bilateral treaty by one 
party justifies the other party in unilaterally treating the treaty as 
suspended or abrogated in whole or part is of doubtful validity. Al-
though most ·writers favor the doctrine,163 its validity has never been 
adjudicated in an international court. It has been referred to in two 
cases before the Permanent Court of International Justice,164 and the 
United States Supreme Court has also recognized the doctrine.165 
But, in practice, nations have rarely attempted to abrogate or sus-
pend a treaty on this basis, and when the attempt has been made, 
the other party has refused to recognize the abrogation.166 The adop-
tion of the doctrine in article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties167 may have settled the issue. Since the Convention 
was adopted by a body composed of representatives from most of the 
nations of the world, it arguably codifies customary international 
law on this point. However, some parts of the Convention develop 
the law beyond current custom,168 and article 60 may fall into that 
category. Furthermore, the Convention is not yet operative as a 
treaty, since it has not been ratified by the requisite number of na-
tions.169 
163. International Law Commn., Report, 21 U.N. GAPR, Supp. 9, at 82, U.N. 
Doc. A/6309 (1966). 
164. Case Concerning the Diversion of Water from the River Meuse, [1937] P.C.I.J., 
ser. A/B, No. 70, at 50 (Anzilotti, J., dissenting); Case Concerning the Factory at Chor-
z6w, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 8, at 31. 
165. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 261 (1796). 
166. 5 G. HACKWORTH, supra note lll, at 342-46. Hackworth notes that the Legal 
Adviser of the State Department recommended against treating German discrimination 
against American trade as grounds for suspending the application to German products 
of concessions contained in the trade agreements, because of the lack of actual practice 1 
of recognizing breach as grounds for suspension or abrogation of a treaty. 
Before 1966 the United States had attempted to invoke this doctrine officially only 
once. In 1798, during a period of strained relations with France, Congress enacted a 
declaration unilaterally abrogating the treaties between the two countries, Act of July 7, 
1798, ch. LXVII, 1 Stat. 578, but France did not recognize the termination. See Hearings 
on Executive M. Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 38-
39 (1963). 
167. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, supra note 112, at 893. 
168. For example, the procedural requirements imposed by articles 65-68 of the 
Vienna Convention, with respect to invalidity, termination, withdrawal from, or sus-
pension of the operation of a treaty, are viewed by some commentators as bold "innova-
tions." Briggs, Procedures for Establishing the Invalidity or Termination of Treaties 
Under the International Law Commission's 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, 
61 AM. J. INTL. L. 976, 977 (1967). 
169. However, the U.S. State Department's policy with regard to use of the doctrine 
that one party's breach justifies the other party's treating the treaty as abrogated has 
changed. In its brief defending U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the United States sought 
to justify its augmentation of military personnel and equipment in South Vietnam 
beyond that permitted in the Cease-Fire Agreement of 1954 by reference to the doctrine. 
Office of the Legal Adviser, Dept. of State, The Legality of United States Participation 
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Although it can be argued that it is unjust to hold one party to 
an agreement-or to a part thereof-that the other party has vio-
lated, the contrary approach is potentially pernicious since it invites 
parties to seize upon the slightest breach as an excuse to wriggle out 
of their treaty commitments. In response to this problem, .the Vienna 
Convention is quite restrictive. The breach relied upon must be 
"material"-that is, it must violate "a provision essential to the ac-
complishment of the object or purpose of the treaty."170 Even if a 
breach is substantial enough to violate international law, it is not 
necessarily sufficiently material to justify a responding breach.171 Be-
cause of the multiple purposes of the FCN treaties, it may be im-
proper to characterize as sufficiently material a breach of the guaran-
tee of national treatment for investors, especially with regard to the 
French and German controls, which do not entirely prevent U.S. di-
rect investment. The Dent-Gaydos bill is more likely to be a material 
breach, for it would effectively exclude all direct investment. The 
Vienna Convention also imposes certain procedural requirements, 
which direct the parties to try to settle the matter through negotia-
tion, international arbitration, or other peaceful means, before the 
doctrine is invoked.172 
If the United States wishes to invoke breaches by ,other parties to 
justify its own restrictions, it must do so on a country-by-country 
basis. Even if this doctrine relieves the United States from its obliga-
tions toward French and German investors, it does not justify gen-
eral restrictions on foreign investment, for some of the FCN treaty 
partners-for instance, Belgium and The Netherlands--have not 
even arguably breached their treaty commitments.173 
Although the two foregoing arguments are probably not sufficient 
to justify U.S. controls, the United States could restrict foreign in-
in the Defense of Vietnam, March 4, 1966, reprinted in 60 AM. J. INTL. LAw 565 (1966). 
See Wright, The Termination and Suspension of Treaties, 61 AM. J. INTL. L. 1000 (1967). 
170. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, para. 3(b), supra note 112, 
at 889. 
171, The test of materiality of a breach should be distinguished from the test of 
substantiality dealt with at note 159 supra and the accompanying text. At least under 
the German treaty, which defines a class of de minimus violations that arc not sub-
stantial enough to be considered breaches, see Treaty with the Federal Republic of 
Germany, supra note 63, art. VII, para. 3, there arc three levels of breach: (1) a technical, 
de minimus breach; (2) a substantial breach that is not so serious as to be "material" but 
for which money damages might be appropriate relief; and (3) a "material" breach, 
which is so serious as to justify a reciprocal breach by the other party, 
172. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, arts. 65-68, supra note 112, at 895-96, 
173. Belgium allows complete freedom of establishment and complete freedom of 
capital flow. CCH COJ\fl\lON MARKET REP., DOING BUSINESS IN EUROPE ,i,i 21,152, 21,161 
(1973). The Netherlands requires that each foreign investor receive an investment permit 
from the Netherlands Bank and approval from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, but 
these requirements appear to be mere formalities once the investor has provided detailed 
information on the nature and size of the operation proposed. Id., ,i 26,653 (1972). 
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vestment and yet be consistent with international law if it were to 
exercise its rights under the termination clause of each treaty. How-
ever, even this approach would not provide a complete solution, be-
cause one of the eleven national-treatment FCN treaties cannot be 
terminated before June 8, 1978.174 Moreover, through termination 
the United States would lose all the advantages secured by existing 
treaties. These advantages range from rights of entry for U.S. tourists 
abroad176 and guarantees of national treatment with respect to access 
to the courts176 to guarantees of national and most-favored-nation 
treatment for vessels and cargoes in foreign ports.177 Most important, 
the U.S. would be terminating treaties that express friendship and 
good will with some of its major allies and investment partners, in-
cluding France, West Germany, The Netherlands, Japan, and Israel. 
Renegotiation might be possible, but, since at least some of these na-
tions have the greatest interest in direct investment in the U.S., it is 
doubtful that they will meekly allow revision to U.S. specifications. 
Moreover, the termination of treaties that lay the foundation for 
peaceful relations between major allies is of great symbolic impor-
tance. It courts the dangers of ill will, the raising of nationalistic bar-
riers to free trade, and major disruptions of foreign relations. 
Existing treaties do give the United States some latitude for a 
limited reversal of policy in those areas excepted from the guarantee 
of "national treatment" in the FCN treaties178 and from the OECD 
Code.179 Again, general restrictions in certain areas, such as commu-
nications, shipping, and air transport, are technically not possible, be-
cause no exceptions are made for these areas in the treaty with Mus-
cat and Oman,180 a preferred status that can be claimed by countries 
that are parties to treaties with most-favored-nation clauses.181 Never-
174. See note 84 supra. It might, however, be possible to renegotiate that treaty. 
175. E.g., Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. II, 
paras. 1-2. 
I 76. E.g., id., art. VI, para. I. 
177. E.g., id., art. XX. 
178. See text accompanying n~tes 70-71 supra. 
179. See note 121 supra. The exceptions made by the U.S. reservation to the Code are 
somewhat narrower than the exceptions to the FCN treaties. The reservation to the 
Code does not include banks or trusts, the exploitation of land or natural resources 
beyond that involving hydroelectric power, precious metals, or arms. See CODE, supra note 
105, Annex B, United, States, list A, I/ A. 
180. See Treaty with Muscat &: Oman, supra note 63. 
181. The U.S. may attempt to close this loophole by arguing that Muscat and Oman 
really have no preferred status as long as none of their citizens invest in any of the 
activities excepted by the other ten national-treatment treaties. This argument is of 
doubtful validity since it iguores the distinction between a right and the exercise of a 
right. Moreover, investors from the other nations could probably induce an investment 
by a Muscat or Oman national in the area in which they were interested. 
The other possible solution is to try to find within the treaty with Muscat and Oman 
some exception that could cover the areas expressly excepted by the other treaties. The 
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theless, the United States does restrict alien ownership in businesses 
involved in some exempted activities, such as communications,182 
coastal and fresh water shipping,183 and the production of atomic 
energy.184 Congress requires that companies engaged in air trans-
port,185 mining on federal lands,186 and the development of water 
power sites on navigable streams187 be organized and chartered under 
United States law, but it has not prohibited foreign control of such 
companies. 
If the United States decides to continue in this direction, exist-
ing restrictions that tolerate foreign control could be made more 
severe, and exceptions that have not been used could be developed. 
The breadth of some exceptions could be explored more thoroughly. 
For instance, an exception for "communications" certainly includes 
those forms of ·communication assisted by telephone, telegraph, ra-
dio, and television,188 but it is not clear whether it encompasses news-
paper publishing. Publishing, like the other communication activ-
ities, does perform a vital function189 in that it, too, disseminates the 
information and opinion necessary to the proper functioning of a 
democracy. However, unlike radio, television, telephone, and tele-
graph activities, there is no inherent limitation on access to news-
paper publishing and hence no need to reserve it to nationals for 
that reason.190 
The reach of the exception for the exploitation of natural re-
sources is even less clear. Mining operations within the United States 
are included within that phrase, and the exception would probably 
allow the United States to prohibit or restrict alien ownership in a 
manufacturing concern that mms interests in mining operations 
escape clause on national security, which is found also in the treaty with Muscat and 
Oman, id., art. XI, para. l(d), offers the greatest elasticity, but it may stretch the concept 
of "essential :qational security interests" too far to seek to bring the operation of trust 
companies, depository banks, or domestic air transport within its ambit. 
182. 47 u.s.c. § 319 (1970). 
183. 46 u.s.c. § ·883 (1970). 
184. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1970). See also 42 U.S.C. § 2134(d) (1970). 
185. 49 u.s.c. §§ 1401, 1508 (1970). 
186. 30 u.s.c. §§ 22, 24 (1970). 
187. 16 U.S.C. § 797(e} (1970). 
188. The protocol to the treaty l\ith Germany specifies that the term "includes 
radio and television, among other means of communication" but gives no further 
definitional clarification. Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, 
Protocol, para. II. 
189. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the vital-
function characteristics of the exceptions to the national-treatment treaties. 
190. Radio and television are characterized by the finite number of channels that it 
is practicable to allow transmitters to use. Communication by telephone and telegraph 
requires transmitting lines, which generally can be erected only through the use of the 
eminent-domain power. 
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within the United States. But it is difficult to tell how far down the 
chain from resource extraction to processing and fabrication the ex-
ception extends. 
The escape clause in the FCN treaties and the OECD Code for 
activities necessary to protect "essential security interests"191 is poten-
tially a much more elastic exception because its rationale is so ex-
pansible. Any basic industry is vital to the United States' economy, 
and ultimately to its defense efforts, and thus arguably falls within 
this exception. On the other hand, by modifying "security interests" 
with the word "essential" the treaty draftsmen apparently sought to 
limit the scope of the escape clause to matters directly pertaining to 
military defense. Even so, the escape 'clause should justify restric-
tions on foreign ownership and control of defense industries that 
supply weapons to the military forces or use classified information. 
This is the area in which the sociopolitical objections to control by 
foreign investors are of greatest validity, and in this area the United· 
States can reverse its policy of openness to foreign investment with-
out breaching its treaty obligations, endangering its own investments 
abroad, and losing the good will of its treaty partners.192 
It should be abundantly clear that, with regard to most activities 
in its economy, a substantial number of treaties obligate the United 
States to maintain its long-standing policy of openness to foreign 
direct investment. Those arguments that might justify derogations 
from the treaty commitments rest on narrow, technical grounds and 
are unpersuasive, if not disingenuous. Treaties are drafted in broad 
language to cover many fact situations and to endure for long 
periods of time. Narrow arguments that frustrate the broad princi-
ples embodied in the treaties are inappropriate, because the sanc-
tions for breach are primarily political and economic, not legal. 
The FCN treaties, like the OECD Code, express a U.S. commit-
ment to an open-door policy for transnational investment. If the 
United States deviates from the substance of that commitment-
whether or not it attempts to justify its actions on technical, legal 
grounds-it should expect to be subjected to political pressure and 
serious economic retaliation. By the same token, the treaty commit-
ments, backed by U.S. compliance, put political pressure on U.S. 
investment partners to dismantle their restrictions on foreign in-
vestment. It is foolish to incur the risk of disrupting commercial re-
191. E.g., Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany, supra note 63, art. XXIV, 
para. l(d); ConE, supra note 105, art. ?(ii). 
192. The protocol to the treaty with The Netherlands provides that neither party 
shall question the other party's judgment as to what is an essential security matter. 
Treaty with The Netherlands, supra note 63, Protocol, art. 18. On the other hand, that 
protocol expressly states the obligation of good faith that each party has in interpreting 
the treaty: "[I]t is understood that it is not the purpose of the security reservation to 
create a basis for unduly prolonged departures from any provision of the Treaty." Id. 
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lations with major allies except for the most compelling of reasons.
Surely with regard to most types of direct investment, the sociopolit-
ical and economic arguments do not overwhelmingly favor restric-
tive legislation.
Instead of seeking to escape from its treaty obligations, the
United States should let its policy be guided by them. The FCN
treaties and the OECD Code are sensibly drafted documents that
espouse the principle of free investment but leave each nation
enough latitude to protect its vital businesses and its national security
interests. Any reversal in policy should be in the manner authorized
by the treaties, and not through the blanket restrictions proposed by
the Dent-Gaydos bill.
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